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Transnational Business relations have assumed phenomenal importance in the 
globalised world of the 21st Century. Corruption in international business relations 
however has become a global problem with a distorting effect on the international 
markets. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (Hereinafter, FCPA) and the UK 
Bribery Act 2010 (Hereinafter, UKBA) are part of a few anti-corruption laws adopted 
to fight bribery and corruption beyond the national level. However, the application of 
national anti-corruption laws across territorial borders raised the issue of legality and 
propriety of extraterritorial measures and their effects on sovereignty and 
jurisdictional competences of states. Therefore, this dissertation critically examines 
the effects of the practice of the doctrine of extraterritoriality on the states within the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. This dissertation 
argues that the present regulation of corruption in international business transactions 
through the use of the doctrine of extraterritoriality presents an unfair and unequal 
regulatory framework. The dissertation examines five related research questions. 
First, how compatible are the extraterritorial jurisdiction inherent in the FCPA and UK 
Bribery Act laws with the doctrine of extraterritorial application of domestic laws in 
international legal practice? Second, is there an effective international legal 
framework which is put in place to curb the bribery of foreign officials in international 
business and will extraterritorial jurisdiction equitably applied help to foster the 
development of this framework? Third, what beneficial or other effects would the 
presence of multiple extraterritorial domestic anticorruption laws have on the 
international community generally? Fourth, to what extent do developing countries 
possess equal extraterritorial regulatory strength in the international regulation of 
corruption? Lastly, with what strategies and in what ways can the unfairness in the 
extraterritorial regulatory framework of corruption in international business 
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IMPERIALISM, EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE 
OF STATES IN ANTI-CORRUPTION REGULATION: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 




Bribery's insidious nature has consumed the international climate of business. The 
globalisation of business has in turn engendered the globalisation of bribery and 
corruption thereby necessitating international legal frameworks to combat this 
dangerous practice. 1  Due to the peculiar nature of national business and its 
efficacious treatments, up until recently, national laws have been regarded as best to 
fight bribery of foreign officials as the relationship is a closely symbiotic one. 
 
However, the international anti-bribery regulatory and compliance frameworks have 
been established in more modern times more precisely since the 1970s within the 
complexities of varied regulatory systems, structures and enforcement mechanism. 
Part of these international regulatory frameworks are extraterritorial national laws 
which are established to fight bribery in international business transactions (IBT). 
The increase of foreign bribery has distorted business efficacy, weakened 
democracy and development, and created unfair and inefficient market competition.2 
Consequently, international strategies to fight corruption are now a major priority in 
policy agenda around the world. In fact, in recent years, the fight against corruption 
has been intensified through the advent of multiple international laws and treaties on 
curbing bribery and its perennial effects on development. These international 
instruments include the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the World Bank, Transparency International (TI), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organisation (WTO), European 
Union (EU), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, African Convention on Preventing and 
                                                          
1
 Ellen S. Podgor, 'Globalisation and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime' (1997) 34 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 325, 330-332 
2
 Elizabeth Spahn, 'Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the FCPA to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption' (2013) 23 Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 1, 1-4  
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Combating Corruption, African Union Anti-Corruption Convention.3 Notably, the key 
national instruments having strong extraterritorial elements are the United States of 
$PHULFD¶V FCPA and the UKBA.4  
 
The present regulation of corruption in IBTs is advanced but also shows the 
unfairness and the inequities which exists in the international regulation of 
corruption. These inequities arguably undermine the sovereignty and jurisdictional 
competence of developing states. The current regulatory framework mostly favours 
countries with major exports and with sophisticated regulatory systems. A possible 
view therefore holds that the present system of regulation is birthed solely for the 
protection of the economic interest of a few elite states. Indeed the present 
regulatory system can be argued to be more concerned about the protection of 
states national interests rather than the prevention of bribery in IBT. The practice of 
economic sovereignty appears to be very closely aligned with the strict workings of 
territoriality in international law and international relations.    
 
The emerging difficulty however rests with the fact that the current application of 
extraterritoriality in the field of international regulation of corruption in trade practices 
presents an actual picture of unfair regulatory framework which undermines the 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of developing states. Not only that the 
history of extraterritoriality is entrenched in the practice of protecWLRQRIFHUWDLQVWDWHV¶
interest leading to the establishment of colonialism, its present practice continues to 
be Eurocentric in nature.5 
 
The extraterritoriality principle has been commonly defined as the application of 
national laws across borders.6 The transnational nature of bribery and corruption in 
                                                          
3
 ,QGLUD &DUU µ)LJKWLQJ &RUUXSWLRQ 7KURXJK Regional and International Conventions: A Satisfactory 
6ROXWLRQ"¶(XU-&ULPH&ULP/	&ULP-XVW 
4
 Tonya Putman, 'Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the 
Regulatory Sphere' (2009) International Organisation 63, 462-465; H. Lowell Brown, 'Extraterritorial 




 Gbenga Oduntan, International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa (Routledge 2015) 17  
6See Anthony J. Colangelo, 'A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality' (2011) 97 Virginia Law Review, 
5, 121; Hannah L. Buxbaum, 'Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict' 
(2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 639; Austen Parrish, 'The Effects Test: 
Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business' (2008) Vanderbilt Law Review 61, 1454-1456; Anthony J. 
&RODQJHOR 
:KDWLV([WUDWHUULWRULDO-XULVGLFWLRQ"¶&RUQHOO/DZ5HYLHZ 99, 1303-1306; Putman 
3 
 
IBTs has triggered increased assertiveness of extraterritorial anti-bribery 
legislations.7  The interconnectedness of the countries of the world in relation to 
business transactions and international commerce was revealed by the dozens of 
instances of bribery and corrupt relationships between the developed and the 
less/under developed nations of the world as established in many decided cases and 
cross-national investigations.8 
 
This dissertation will draw upon examples of the pertinent transnational 
developments in treaty law, case law and investigations across the areas of business 
corruption and grand corruption including the bribery of foreign officials, money 
laundering and corruption involving persons in high level offices.   
 
1.1 Extraterritoriality: A Challenge to Weaker States 
 
Controversy lingers as to whether international public law is Eurocentric in nature 
and international relations is stacked against the interest of developed states. There 
is a view that this situation affects African states very severely and the states in the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) states may be used as a 
prism to examine this effect.9 This dissertation examines these concerns and seeks 
to demonstrate that there are grave regulatory inequities in the established systems 
of domestic application of anti-bribery legislations. These inequities have been 
rationalised as inevitable, and a result of the economic fate of nations that can hardly 
be changed. The hypothesis to be tested, therefore, is that both unintentionally and 
sometimes intentionally the leading economic jurisdiction of Europe and the West 
generally as well as their domestic institutions have undermined the sovereignty and 
jurisdictional competence of developing states in order to maintain the economic and 
political interests of a few elite western states.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(n 3) 462-463; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States $402 (1987); 
Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 133 S. Ct 1659.  
7
 Alan Hudson, Beyond the borders: Globalisation, sovereignty and extra-territoriality (1998) 
Department of Geography, University of Cambridge United Kingdom. 3 Geopolitics 1, 89 
8
 Katherine Florey, 'State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality 
Principles in Choice of Law and Legislation' (1999) 84 Notre Dame Law Review 3, 1060.  
9
 Oduntan (n 5) 136 
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This dissertation examines and critiques the use of the extraterritoriality principle via 
the provisions of the FCPA and the UKBA in corruption cases and investigations 
involving multinationals operating particularly within the ECOWAS region. It engages 
with contemporary conceptualisation of the law and practice of extraterritoriality 
within the context of anti-corruption law. The aim is to critically assess the effects of 
the emerging practice of extraterritoriality within anti-corruption legislation in light of 
their compatibility or otherwise with the traditional principles of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction.10  
 
This dissertation discusses the injustice present in the international regulatory 
framework for combating corruption in IBTs. The major characteristics of the 
regulatory framework is the respective states' extraterritorial application of their 
domestic laws abroad. In order for this dissertation to engage in a nuanced 
discussion of this unfairness, it will discuss the concept and doctrine of 
extraterritoriality and how extraterritoriality has changed in form but not in function. 
The historical and present purpose of extraterritoriality are both entrenched in the 
protection of states' interests.  
 
Although more research still needs to be done on the history, anatomy, science, 
economics and cost of corruption.11 It is understandable that the complex malaise of 
corruption especially in the developing states is partly as a result of the impact of 
colonialism on their culture, political system and structures.12 
                                                          
10
 Karl M. Meessen, Extraterritorial jurisdiction in theory and practice (Kluwer Law International Ltd, 
1996) 75-77; Wayne Sandholtz and Mark M. Gray, 'International Integration and National Corruption' 
(2003) 57 International Organisation 4,  761-800  
<http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818303574045> accessed 3 January 2015; Philip M. 
Nichols, 'The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion' (2000) 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 627, 
627-656 
11
 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Bogle-/¶2XYHUWXUH3XEOLFDWLRQV 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Susan Rose-$FNHUPDQµ7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI&RUUXSWLRQ¶LQ.LPEHUO\$QQ(OOLRWWHGCorruption 
and the Global Economy (Institute for International Economy 1997); 31-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Kimberly Ann Elliott (ed), Corruption and the Global Economy (Institute for International Economy 
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(1998) 45 International Monetary Fund 4, 559-561 
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7KH6RFLRORJLFDO5HYLHZ-190; Munyae M. 
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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  $IU - 3ROLW 6FL  -20 
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003002003.pdf> accessed on 28 March 2016; Munyae M. Mulinge anG*ZHQ1/HVHWHGLµ&RUUXSWLRQ
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The study, thus, considers the historical development as well as purpose of the 
FCPA and the UKBA in order to expose their extraterritorial effects on judicial and 
other competences of the select group of developing states in handling corruption 
cases.13 The hypothesis to be tested is whether the extraterritoriality principle has 
become just another tool in the international relations of stronger states against 
weaker states and whether the principle of extraterritoriality has helped in reducing a 
complex international problem of corruption in international business. This 
dissertation will seek to consider evidence of cooperation or resistance within these 
states to possible encroachments on their sovereignty, jurisdiction and self-
governance. The study also considers the ways and means by which a wider access 
to the use of extraterritoriality may be to the greater advantage of the international 
system and perhaps reduce its current inequities.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
There is an increasing use of extraterritorial anti-bribery laws in IBTs mostly by elite 
states. The present regulatory framework in the enforcement of extraterritoriality on 
corruption tilts toward the protection of the interests of few elite states, and this in 
turn undermines the authority of developing states to regulate their affairs and curb 
corruption in the international sphere. While the purpose of combating bribery and 
corruption in IBTs is crucial, the regulatory framework, tone and extraterritorial 
practice of the law does not only portray a deep unfairness in the regulatory sphere 
but it also encumbers the entity of the traditional principles of sovereignty and 
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007001004.pdf> accessed on 28 MarFK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 Andrew Brady Spalding, 'The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progressivism and China's 
New Laissez-Faire' (2012) 59 UCLA L. Rev, 397-398 < 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/uclalr59&div=13&collection=journals&set_as_cu




1.3 Methodology and Chapter Summaries 
 
The overarching question this dissertation aimV WR DQVZHU LV µZKDW LPSDFW the 
extraterritorial14 application of anti-bribery legislations has on the sovereignty and 
jurisdictional competence of developing countries. To answer this question, this 
dissertation employs a critical legal approach towards international law to determine 
the way in which it has been employed to camouflage and maintain a bias towards 
the benefits of global elite (richer western states). Critical legal theory propounds that 
the form that law takes is ascertained by the power and authority relationships of the 
VRFLHW\,WHQYLVLRQVODZDVDµVWUXFWXUHDQGORJLFWKDWOHJLWLPLVHVLQMXVWLFHRIVRFLHW\¶
by sustaining the varied interests of the members that inspired its evolution.15 Law is 
a mechanism for domination that is used by powerful states to retain and maintain 
their place at the top of the political, social and economic ladder.    
 
The focal notion of the theory is that law is not unprejudiced or neutral in its function, 
form and purpose rather, it is political. This approach helps to frame the setting 
within which extraterritorial anti-bribery legislations operate that is, the global system 
of control that is preserved by international law under the auspices of 
extraterritoriality. 
 
This chapter outlines the history of extraterritoriality in international law and 
international relations. The work of Shih Shun Liu16 will be employed to create an 
understanding of the history of extraterritoriality. Integral to the concept of 
H[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\ LV WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI VWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV - political and economic. 
Integrating the history of extraterritoriality in this dissertation is essential to the 




                                                          
14
 The common definition of extraterritoriality, which will feature mostly in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 of this 
work is the notion that extraterritoriality means the application of laws across borders.  
15
 Ian Ward, Introduction to Critical Legal Theory (Routledge Cavendish 2004) 101 
16
 Shih Shun Liu, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Decline (Green and Co., Agents London 1925) 4-116 
<http://panarchy.org/shihshunliu/Extraterritoriality_Liu.pdf > accessed 19 June 2015 
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Chapter Two  
Although this chapter will not provide an in-depth analysis into the regulation of crime 
in international business, it will however set the foundation for understanding what 
extraterritoriality is, how it works and its usage in international business.  
   
Chapter two sets the foundation to the whole dissertation. This chapter sets to 
answer the question, why is the study of extraterritoriality important in understanding 
the regulation of corruption? What is the history and conceptual foundation of 
extraterritoriality in international law and international relations? The study of 
extraterritoriality is crucial because not only does the history of extraterritoriality 
inform the present day unfair practice of extraterritoriality, the present regulation of 
corruption in the international sphere serves as an example of the weaknesses in the 
execution of the extraterritorial principle. This chapter historicises the principle of 
extraterritoriality, its meaning and usage in international legal practice. It discusses 
the foundational principles of the concept in international law and international 
relations. In this discussion, the chapter engages with the landmark principles of 
sovereignty, jurisdiction and non-interference. It discusses the sources and 
justifications of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This chapter centres on the argument that 
extraterritoriality is justifiable in this globalised world where products, people and 
goods and services are internationalised. However, the same chapter presents that 
this principle possesses a high potency to intrude upon the ancient international law 
concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction which are the bedrocks of every state's 
capacity to organise its domestic affairs against external intrusion. The chapter will 
argue that the past practice of extraterritoriality dominates the present practice of 
extraterritoriality in international law.   
 
Chapter Three 
The question at the centre of this chapter is whether extraterritoriality in the 
regulation of bribery strengthens the principles of sovereignty and jurisdictional 
competence. The central argument of this chapter is based on the fact that the 
present extraterritorial regulatory framework does not show the significance of 
extraterritoriality principles in ascertaining the sovereignty and jurisdictional 
competence of developing states. This chapter presents a substantive understanding 
of the examples of extraterritorial instruments in international law. It discusses the 
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Acts and Conventions which serve to combat bribery and corruption in IBTs. This 
section defines the topic of foreign bribery, its impact on IBT, its effect on 
development and the tenets of ethical business transactions. It discusses the 
beneficial and deleterious effects of the presence of multiple extraterritorial domestic 
anti bribery laws on the international community. Additionally, it also discusses the 
assertion that exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction abroad helps forum states 
manage their affairs as well as equip host states in dealing with the perennial 
problem of bribery and corruption. This dissertation seeks to discuss multiple 
extraterritorial instruments in fighting against the bribery of foreign officials. The 
discussion of these instruments is essential for creating a holistic background to the 
understanding of the various anti-bribery instruments that there are and their 
purposes and impacts on the fight against bribery of foreign officials in IBTs. 
 
Chapter Four 
The question this chapter seeks to discuss is whether extraterritoriality undermines 
the principles of sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of ECOWAS state. This 
chapter will argue that the stance of the present extraterritorial regulatory framework 
on corruption in the international realm tilts toward favouring the elite states.  
 
The chapter will employ the cases of James Ibori, Buruji Kashamu and Dick Cheney, 
amongst others to show the power play between developed and developing 
countries' interests on regulating the malaise of corruption in IBT. In this dissertation, 
the power play to be discussed is between developing stats such as the US and the 
UK, and some countries in the ECOWAS community. The major issue to be 
discussed regarding these cases is that the recent extraterritorial application of 
national laws on corruption shows that whilst western states are swift to enforce their 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on developing states, they both advertently and 
inadvertently resist the attempts of developing states to exercise their extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. The FCPA and the UKBA, amongst other extraterritorial legislations are 
used to portray how bribery and corruption are being robustly dealt with on both 
national and international levels. Host states are compelled to tune their antenna to 
the velocity of the values of the international community which is to combat bribery 




The radical application of the FCPA and the UKBA are inconsistent with the 
international law principles of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Making bribery a criminal 
act under the FCPA and the UKBA was an important step against such a noxious 
act. However, the jurisdiction under these acts have expanded to an extent that they 
without reciprocity interfere with the sovereign power and jurisdiction of developing 
states such as the ECOWAS thereby, intruding on their capacity to deal with their 
domestic affairs. This section employs the use of bribery cases and investigations to 
discuss the extent to which the unequal level of cooperation and assistance amongst 
states (developed and developing states) can undermine the sovereignty and 
jurisdictional competence of ECOWAS states.   
 
Chapter Five  
This chapter seeks to provide solutions to the unfairness inherent in the regulatory 
framework of extraterritoriality in combating the bribery of foreign officials in IBTs 
between the Western states and ECOWAS states. The present regulatory framework 
in the enforcement of extraterritoriality on corruption tilts toward the protection of the 
interests of few elite states, and this in turn undermines the authority of developing 
states to regulate their affairs and curb corruption in the international sphere. This 
chapter states that there should be a universal anti-bribery legislation with definite 
enforcement power.  
 
1.4 Understanding the ECOWAS Community 
 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975. 
Its purpose is to foster interstate economic and political cooperation. This 
cooperation and relationship was fostered for the betterment of the member-states 
which are; Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, the Island of Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and 
Togo.17  This integration was created to foster the development and sustenance of 
institutions which are concerned with developing strategies to empower energy, 
infrastructure, ICT, civil society, trade, water, agriculture, health and social affairs, 
                                                          
17
 µ(FRQRPLF &RPPXQLW\ RI :HVW $IULFDQ 6WDWHV (&2:$6 0HPEHU-States) < 
http://www.ecowas.int/member-states/> accessed on 3 April 2015. 
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monetary and financial questions, telecommunications and political affairs.18 These 
institutions were formed to harmonise the economical, industrial and agricultural 
policies of ECOWAS members.19 
 
The creation of the region allows for free movement of people in the region which 
would help to step up the process of development in the region. The ECOWAS 
community on various occasions have attempted to extend their extraterritorial 
jurisdiction especially on cases pertaining to the impact of atrocities caused on the 
region.20 
 
ECOWAS fosters active relationship and travel within its member-states. There has 
been an increase in the economic relationships between member-states. This 
increase has fostered the growth and development of regional corporations. 21 
Between 2011 and 2012 there was a significant evolution in the in-flow of trade 
within the ECOWAS community. Products ranging from animal products to mineral 
products encountered significant economic exchange and purchase within the 
ECOWAS community. The economic activities in this region possess a combined 
GDP of $734.8 billion.22 Clearly, not only does MNCs engage in business with the 
ECOWAS states, ECOWAS corporations are increasingly becoming 
interdependent. 23  West Africa remains one of the strongest growing economies 
amongst its African counterparts. An estimated growth as much as 6.3 percent was 
recorded in 2013.24 In order to foster economic integration, efforts have been made 
WR KDUPRQLVH ³PLFURHFRQRPLF SROLFLHV DQG SULYDWH VHFWRU SURPRWLRQ WRZDUGV
                                                          
18
 Ato Quayson and Antonela Arhin (eds), Labour Migration, Human Trafficking and Multinational 
Corporations: The Commodification of Illicit Flows (Routledge 2012) 99-100 
19
 Azalahu Akwara et al, 'The Role of Regional Economic and Political Groups in the Globalisation 
Process: A Case Study of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (1982-2002)' 
(2013), Canadian Social Science, Vol.9, No.6, 67-68  
20
 PeneloSH1HYLOO µ0LOLWDU\6DQFWLRQV(QIRUFHPHQWLQWKH$EVHQFHRI([SUHVV$XWKRULVDWLRQ¶LQ0DUF
Weller, Alexia Sololou and Jake William Rylatt (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in 
International Law (OUP 2015) 287 
21
 See µ%DVLF ,QIRUPDWLRQ (FRQRPLF &RPPXQLW\ RI :HVW $IULFDQ 6WDWHV¶ (&2:$6 
http://www.ecowas.int/doing-business-in-ecowas/import-and-export/regional-trade-statisrics/ > 




 6HH µ5HJLRQDO 7UDGH 6WDWLVWLFV (FRQRPLF &RPPXQLW\ RI :HVW $IULFDQ 6WDWHV¶ (&2:$6
http://www.ecowas.int/doing-business-in-ecowas/import-and-export/regional-trade-statisrics/ 
accessed on 4 April 2016 
24
 See µ%DVLFLQIRUPDWLRQ(&2:$6¶Q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DFKLHYLQJ HFRQRPLF LQWHJUDWLRQ´ 25  As a result of these efforts, initiatives on the 
structure and roadmap of ECOWAS single currency has been implemented. 
Regional institutions were created to foster the planning, monitoring, microeconomic 
convergence, evaluation of performance, management of the ECOWAS 
Macroeconomic Database and Multilateral Surveillance System (ECOMAC) were 
established.26  
 
The governance structure comprises of the Executive, the Judiciary and the 
Legislature. All these arms are involved in the prescription, enforcement and 
adjudication of the FRPPXQLW\¶V OHJLVODWLRQV27 Matters concerning the prescription 
and enforcement of anti-corruption laws can be carried out by all parts of this 
system.  
 
ECOWAS is moving towards an increased economic integration 28  with the 
emergence of significant increase in business deals within member states and 
between non-members states like China, India and Japan amongst others.29 For 
example, in 2010, multinational mining and steel groups in Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
and Liberia came to agreements on iron-ore mining projects and contracts.30 These 
forms of agreement cut across every nook and cranny of successful state 
development and investment. 
 
Due to the rich nature of the ECOWAS community for tapping raw materials, 
investment and business, many international influences are applicable in this region. 
These influences persist as a result of the legacy of colonialism in this region. The 
period of colonisation disrupted traditional, social, economic and political parastatals 
in the ECOWAS region. On the other hand, while prices of exported goods are 
falling, import prices are astronomically high and climbing. Unemployment is on the 






 µ*RYHUQDQFH 6WUXFWXUH (FRQRPLF &RPPXQLW\ RI :HVW $IULFDQ 6WDWHV¶ (&2:$6 
http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/governance-structure/ > accessed on 3 April 2016 
28
 Akwara et al (n 19) 67-68. This economic integration plan is geared towards coordination in areas 
such as industrialisation planning, exchange rate determination and monetary policy.  
29





ULVH FDXVLQJ XUEDQ SRSXODWLRQ LQIOX[´ 31  The economies have never produced a 
manufacturing base, nor have there been any practical efforts to utilise comparative 
economic advantage within the ECOWAS members¶ states. 32  The legacy of 
colonialism still lingers.33 For instance, at the start of the 1970s, nearly 80 per cent of 
imports and exports of ECOWAS states were Europe-bound. Ever since, ECOWAS 
states have been an arena of major exports and imports with Asia, Europe and North 
$PHULFD ³$GGHG WR WKLV JHRJUDSKLFDO GHSHQGHQFH ZDV WKH KDQGLFDS RI H[SRUWLQJ
only agricultural raw materials that were barely processed or not processed at all, 
hence their low vDOXHDGGHG´34   
 
 
                                                          
31
 Joseph Guannu, Nation-States and the Challenge of Regional Integration in West Africa: The Case 




 In the 15th Century, Africa entered into a special relationship with Europe, which resulted to the 
depopulation and devastation of Africa, but contributed to the development and wealth of Europe. 
Some African leaders did attempt to resist the devastation of the European demand for trade and 
FDSWLYHV,Q³.LQJ$JDMD7UXGRRI'DKRPH\QRWRQO\RSSRsed the trade, but even went as far as 
WRDWWDFNWKHIRUWVWKDWWKH(XURSHDQSRZHUVKDGFRQVWUXFWHGRQWKHFRDVW´ See B. Davidson, Africa in 
History (Weidenfeld and Nicholson 2001); K. Shillington, Encyclopedia of African History (Fitzroy 
Dearborn, 2005); 'U+DNLP$GLµ$IULFDDQGWKH$WODQWLF6ODYH7UDGH¶BBC History News, 05 October 
2012) http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/abolition/africa_article_01.shtml accessed on 15 March 
2015 
34
 2(&'6DKHODQG:HVW$IULFD&OXE µ7KH6RFLR-economic and Regional Context of West African 





EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF 





+LVWRULFDOO\ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV WKH ZRUG µH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\¶, often used 
interchangeaEO\ZLWK WKHZRUG µH[WHUULWRULDOLW\¶, denotes the special status of foreign 
ambassadors who enjoy the right of exemption from the local jurisdiction. In 
international law, extraterritoriality simply means the application of law across 
national borders. This chapter asserts that, usually, extraterritoriality is employed to 
SURWHFW VSHFLILF VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW 1 Understanding the historical custom of 
µH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\¶ LV SLYRWDO WR XQGHUVWDQGLQJ FRQWHPSRUDU\ PHDQLQJ DQG XVDJH RI
extraterritoriality in international public law and international legal practice in general. 
In fact, ideas for grasping these processes and orders have shifted between forms. 
The practical pursuit and application of the concept varies in degree and intensity.2  
 
This chapter argues that the use of extraterritoriality in international law fosters the 
political interest of states at the expense of the principles of equality of sovereignty 
and jurisdictional regulation which international law also purports to strengthen. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to show that the historical use of extraterritoriality has 
only changed in form but not in function. The use is entrenched in the protection of 
states' interest and immunity, and this protection is the same as the function of the 
present extraterritorial application in international law, especially in relation to the 
regulation of IBT. Undoubtedly, at the heart of international law is the protection of a 
state's domestic affairs, and important national affairs in turn birth state interests 
which international law seeks to protect. This chapter will, therefore, help build the 
                                                          
1
 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'Extraterritoriality' <http://www.britannica.com/topic/extraterritoriality> 
accessed on 2 May 2015.   
2
 Definition wise, the term extraterritorial consists of the amalgamation of two words - 'Extra' and 
'territorial'- which simply means beyond the territory or in addition to the territory. Erich Vranes stated 
WKDWZRUGVVXFKDVH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\DVVLPSOHDV WKH\PD\VHHPRQO\ ³UHSUHVHQWVDFRQGHQVDWLRQ
DQG VLPSOLILFDWLRQ RI PRUH FRPSOH[ µUHDOLWLHV¶´ See Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment  




argument that the present usage of extraterritoriality in combating corruption in IBT 
serves both positive and negative reasons as a modern tool of the old function of 
political extra-territorialism. This aspect of the dissertation will compare the previous 
usage of extraterritoriality in history with current usages in international law to argue 
that even though the form of the application of extraterritoriality has changed, its 
function, which is to protect politically determined state interests has not changed. 
 
To assess the understanding of this history on contemporary International Law and 
International Relations, the present dissertation is concerned with the varied 
interests preserved in some early extraterritorial application which changed in types 
but not in purpose. This chapter will thus, serve as a useful foundation to future 
chapters in this dissertation because it will demonstrate how understanding the 
usage of extraterritoriality in the past provides an insight into the contemporary 
manifestation of the principle in a very critical and important area of international law 
and relations today ± international anticorruption law and practice. This chapter will, 
therefore, conclude by stating that although the structural basis of extraterritoriality is 
straight forward in composition, however the functionality possesses different layers 
which are subject to different purposes and outcomes.  
  
2.1 A Brief History of Extraterritoriality 
 
 The more you know about the past, the better prepared you are for the future 
 (Theodore Roosevelt) 
 ,I \RXGRQ¶W NQRZKLVWRU\ WKHQ\RXGRQ¶W NQRZDQ\WKLQJ<RXDUHD OHDI WKDW
 GRHVQ¶W know it is part of a tree. (Michael Crichton) 
 
Historically, the use of extraterritoriality witnessed many a rise and decline. Its thread 
is traceable from religious basis of early law in Europe,3 late medieval capitulations 
in the Ottoman Empire, to British conferment of extraterritoriality with the far eastern 
countries4 in the late 19th century, Asia, and Africa.5 In this manner, the existence of 
                                                          
3
 See Chapter One,  Liu (n 16) 8-47 In Early Maritime Coast of Europe for example, one of the major 




 Ibid, 40-47  
15 
 
extraterritoriality was rendered in different forms with diverse purposes, and currently 
it has reappeared as part of transnational and international regulatory tools 
HPSOR\HGWRSURWHFWVWDWHV¶LQWHUHVWV6  
 
In the 10th Century, the development of merchant law as a form of extraterritoriality 
was carried out throughout the middle ages for trade purposes. The aim of the 
merchant law was to provide a kind of protection to merchants and subjects living 
abroad from local laws and jurisdictions.7 Along the line, in the 19th Century, the 
IXQFWLRQRIH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\FKDQJHG IURPFLWL]HQV¶SURWHFWLRQ IURP ORFDO MXULVGLFWLRQ
to an administrative device utilised by stateV WR ³GLYLGH VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG SURWHFW
PDLQO\ %ULWLVK VXEMHFWV DEURDG´ 8  Through this, the colonialists 9  were able to 
³LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVH WKH WHUULWRULDO DQG DGPLQLVWUDWLYH EDVHV RI :HVWHUQ VWDWHV DQG
HPSLUHV´10  
 
Evidently therefore, the history of extraterritoriality provides the understanding and 
appraisal of a repeated tactic for the controlling of legal differences between 
sovereign states.11 Its operation is deeply rooted in the protection of diverse states' 
welfares and benefits. As a result, the ardent will and concern to control legal as well 
as social and cultural variances has continually led to the natural progression of 
extraterritorial assertion in the globalised world of the 21st Century legal and political 
arena.  
 
Recently, extraterritorial assertions are ever more evident in international law. More 
specifically, its use covers a span of functions, which can be identified in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5
 Ibid, 23-25  
6
 C. G. Fenwick, 'National Security and International Arbitration' (1924) Vol. 18 The American Journal 
of International Law 4, 777-781; Edith Hollan Jones, 'An Interest Analysis Approach to 
Extraterritoriality Application of Rule 10b-5' (1973-1974) 52 Tex. L. Rev. 983, 992 
7
 Raonar Numelin, The Beginning of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International 
Relations (Oxford University Press 1950) 3-10 
8
 Maia Pal, The Politics of Extraterritoriality: A Historical Sociology of Public International Law (PhD 
Thesis, University of Sussex 2012) 45 <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/45248/1/Pal%2C_Ma%C3%AFa.pdf> 
accessed on 18 June 2015  
9
 See Liu (n 3) 4-5. Even foreign ambassadors enjoyed the right of exemption from the local 




 Pal (n 8) 46 
11
 Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of Territoriality in American 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009)   
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following. First, the Iran and Libyan Sanctions Act was fashioned to protect the US 
interest against WHUURULVWV¶ nuclear program, which resulted in the ban against US 
trade and investment with Iran.12 An older but currently relevant use may also be 
found in the GHFDGH¶V long US embargo against Cuba. This embargo was created to 
block commercial, economic and financial relationships with Cuba after the Cuban 
regime nationalised oil refineries owned by America without compensation.13 Despite 
recent celebrated thawing of political relations between the United States and Cuba 
witnessing an epochal visit by President Obama to Cuba, the highly punitive and 
political sanctions against Cuba are maintained. A recent governmental guideline 
shows this when it stated: 
 
Yes, the Cuba embargo remains in place. Most transactions between the 
United States, or persons subject to US jurisdiction, and Cuba continue to be 
prohibited, and OFAC continues to enforce the prohibitions of the CACR. The 
regulatory changes, effective in January, June, and September 2015, as well 
as in January and March 2016, respectively, are targeted to further engage 
and empower the Cuban people by facilitating authorized travel to Cuba by 
persons subject to US jurisdiction; certain authorized commerce and financial 
transactions; and the flow of information to, from, and within Cuba.14 
 
Other uses of extraterritoriality arise in Human Rights Law, Environmental Law and 
Criminal Law. An area peculiar to the purpose of this dissertation is the function of a 






                                                          
12
 Sasan Fayazmanesh, 'The Politics of the U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran' (2003) 35 Review 
of Radical Political Economics 3, 221-225, 227-232 
13
 See brief history, interest and purpose of U.S. Embargo Against Cuba in John W. Smagula, 
µ5HGLUHFWLQJ)RFXV-XVWLI\LQJWKH86(PEDUJR$JDLQVW&XEDDQG5HVROYLQJWKH6WDOHPDWH¶
1&- ,QW¶O/DQG&RP5HJ- µ7LPHOLQH86-&XED5HODWLRQV¶ BBC News, 11 October 
2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12159943> accessed on 18 August 2015   
14
 86 'HSDUWPHQW 2I 7KH 7UHDVXU\ µ)UHTXHQWO\ $VNHG 4XHVWLRQV 5HODWHG 7R &XED¶ U.S. 
Department Of The Treasury, 15 March 2016) <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf> accessed on 29 March 2016. See also 
'DPLHQ&DYHµ:LWK2EDPD9LVLWWR&XED1HZ<RUN7LPHV2OG%DWWOH/LQHV)DGH2XW¶The New York 
Times, 26 March 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/world/americas/with-obama-visit-to-
cuba-old-battle-lines-fade.html?_r=0> accessed on 29 March 2015.  
15
 See Chapter 3 and 4 for a detailed discussion on the criminalisation of the bribery of foreign officials 




2.2 What is Extraterritoriality? 
 
The multitude of divergent views on extraterritoriality, thriving on the dearth of clear 
rules, has led to the development of the dynamics of the concept in practice.16 
Extraterritoriality in international law is famously defined as the application of national 
laws across its borders.17 %ODFN¶V /DZ 'LFWLRQDU\ defined extraterritoriality as that 
ZKLFK³FRQFHUQVWKHRSHUDWLRQRIODZVRXWVLGHWKHERXQGDU\RIDVWDWHRUFRXQWU\´18 
As simple as these definitions may seem, Vranes asserted that they simply 
UHSUHVHQW ³«D FRQGHQVDWLRQ DQG VLPSOLILFDWLRQ RI PRUH FRPSOH[ UHDOLWLHV 19  He 
stated that for there to be a nuanced understanding of the concept, a de-construction 
of notions of jurisdiction, sovereignty, non-interference, balancing of interests and 
proportionality is pivotal; against these notions is the understanding, although not a 
total understanding, of the concept of extraterritoriality.20 
 
From a legislative angle, the Westphalia Treaty21 and UN Charter Articles 2(1) paras. 
1, 4 and 7822 have established the concept of sovereignty as an international legal 
norm. Essentially they established the principle that a state possesses jurisdiction to 
employ its legislative power and authority to enforce laws within its territorial 
boundaries. In the same vein, Alan Hudson stated that, for state sovereignty, 
bounded territory possesses the bundling rule-making authority over its regulatory 
sphere, which serves as the hallmark of modern international system and comity.23 
,Q %RGLQ¶V SHUVSHFWLYH FRPSUHKHQVLYHO\ WKH VROH IXQFWLRQ RI D PRGHUQ VWDWH LV WR
                                                          
16
 Usually, in international law, simple notions such as extraterritoriality, sovereignty, jurisdiction and 
non-interference tend to ³GHYHORSDG\QDPLFRIWKHLURZQ´9UDQHVQ 
17
 See Kiobel (Chapter 1, n 5); Restatement (Third) (Chapter 1, n 5);  Parrish (Chapter 1, n 5); 
Buxbaum (Chapter 1, n 5); Putman (Chapter 1, n 3) 462-465; Colangelo (Chapter 1, n 5) Colangelo 
(Chapter 1, n 5) 
18
 7KH %ODFN¶V /DZ 2QOLQH 'LFWLRQDU\ µ:KDW LV H[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\"¶
<http://thelawdictionary.org/extraterritoriality/> accessed on 2 May 2015 
19
 See Vranes (n 2) 123-125 
20
 Ibid, 96 
21
 Ronald Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1718 - 48 (New York: 
Palgrave 1997) 133-134 
22
 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV µ&KDUWHU RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV¶ (United Nations 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html> accessed on 25 July 2015.  Under the UN Charter, 
"the Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. ... All 
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
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organise domestic affairs through created legislations.24 The UN Charter Article 78 
provided that for a state to be sovereign, it must possess 'sovereign equality', which 
LV DOVR VHHQ DV UHIHUULQJ WR WKH KRUL]RQWDO µGLVWULEXWLRQ RI FRPSHWHQFHV DQG
MXULVGLFWLRQV¶25 This gives each state the power (jurisdiction) to manage its territory 
without any intrusion. 26  Therefore, both developing states and developed states 
possess equal jurisdiction to manage their territorial affairs without external 
interference.  
 
On the other hand, a state does not possess absolute sovereignty in that it can be 
intruded if it violates principles of jus cogens.27 With the increase in global flow of 
capital across borders, immigration, internationalisation of production and 
multinational corporations, international law has emerged over the years to extend 
the state's jurisdiction over an activity or a person outside of its territorial jurisdiction. 
In this line, Walker stated that spatial relations are too complex to be compared to 
simple legalistic maps of state sovereignty.28   
 
At a time of increasing confusion about the actual meaning and content of the rule of 
state's sovereignty in contemporary international law, the technical debate on the 
customary law of jurisdiction and extraterritoriality has gained momentum. The 
complexity of economic relations, financial transactions and anti-corruption 
regulations in the world system made it difficult to determine which jurisdiction 
controls what activities. 29  It is noted in Meessen's work that in times of open 
economical, transportation and communicational systems, sovereignty cannot be 
FRQFHLYHG RI DV D µULJKW WR WHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\¶ 30  According to him, sovereignty 
FRQVWLWXWHV WKH µULJKW WR VDIHJXDUGLQJ WKH IXQFWLRQLQJRI WKHVWDWHXQGHUVWRRGDVDQ
DXWRQRPRXVFHQWUHRIJRYHUQDQFH¶ZKLFK LVSURWHFWHGE\ WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIQRQ-
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interference.31 In this perception, both the power to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and the right to be protected against extraterritorial regulations of the other states are 
emanations of the modern concept of sovereignty.  
 
2.2.1 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in International Law 
 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is derived from the jurisdictional basis of international 
law.32 In international law, jurisdiction refers to a state's legal competence to regulate 
the conduct of its persons, be it natural or juridical persons.33 The meaning of the 
term jurisdiction presents a workable framework for the understanding of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In this vein, extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to a state's 
legal competence under international law to regulate the conduct of persons - natural 
and juridical - outside its borders.34 Jurisdiction is also the means for a state to 
organise its domestic order. Jurisdiction is further defined as the means by which a 
state "makes use of its 'prima facie right' to comprehensively determine its domestic 
affairs".35 Peculiar to these definitions is the assertion that a state has the power to 
regulate and organise it's affairs in all ramifications. Therefore, any measure that 
disrupts this competence causes interference, which in turn impedes the entity of a 
'sovereign state';36 extraterritorial assertion is part of state's jurisdiction to organise 
its domestic order. 
 
Whilst the history of international law is contested, its source is contested as well. 
Some commentators 37  argue that there is no international law, whereas others 
argued that international law exists. Whether or not international law exists or 
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whether states should usurp the lack of clarity of the basis, history and existence of 
international law has been a subject of intense debate.38  
 
International law is argued not to exist as a result of the fact that it does not fulfil the 
characteristics of law.39 Most of the rules of international law are either prohibitive or 
permissive. 40  In other words the state is normally not obliged or compelled by 
international law to exercise its criminal jurisdiction. 41  Whilst the history of 
international law is contested,42 one of the main purposes accrued to its existence is 
a framework set up to ensure stable and organised transnational/international 
relations. These purposes entail resolving complex jurisdictional disputes and the 
strengthening of states sovereignty. However, various scholars have postulated that 
international law is deliberately stultified to protect the interests of a few elite's states 
(or in the past colonialists).43 On one hand international law seeks to ensure equal 
sovereignty while on the other hand, the present structure of international law seeks 
WR SURWHFW GHYHORSHG VWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV $ MXVWLILFDWLRQ WKDW FDQ EH DFFUXHG WR WKLV
assertion under critical legal theory is that law is used as a tool of control for the 
benefit of the creators of the law.44 $V)UHHGPDQSHUVXDVLYHO\PDLQWDLQV³2QHPXVW
start by knowing what is going on, by freeing oneself from the mystified delusions 
embedded in our consciousness by the liberal OHJDOZRUOGYLHZ´45 It is pertinent that 
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this critical instinct must be maintained in relation to international law and that the 
workings of international anticorruption law must not be exempt from scrutiny.  
 
Nearly all aspects of international regulation are carried out by a group of 'privileged 
states'. For instance, international public law and international commercial law are 
contemporary examples of who regulates the international legal order. Similarly, the 
contemporary use of extraterritorial application of laws in the international sphere still 
appears to be rooted in the preservation of interests of globally-strong players. 
However, it is important to note that economically or politically weaker (developing) 
countries also suffer from the lack of will, required enforcement capacity and 
jurisdiction to support the extraterritorial application of own local or international 
laws.46 This obvious lack of capacity, arguably, far undermines its own territorial 
jurisdiction as it relates to, for instance, trans-national corruption and perhaps, may 
encourage its exposure to illegal business conducts. 
 
As rightly stated by Charlesworth, a "concern with crisis skews the discipline of 
international law".47 He says that by regarding 'crisis' as its bread and butter and the 
instrument of progressive growth and development of international law, international 
law becomes just a source for the status quo. 48  A way forward is to refocus 
international law on matters of structural justice that underpin everyday life. An 
international law of everyday life would necessitate a methodology to consider the 
views of non-elite groups.49 The critical legal theory opined that law is created to 
maintain hierarchy, international law is not exempt from this postulation. It is obvious 
that the major construct of international is designed to propel the agenda of strong 
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2.2.2 Basis of Jurisdiction for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
 
Under public international law, there are norms and principles that form the 
foundational basis of jurisdiction. These principles represent the notion of autonomy 
and the right to exercise jurisdiction. 50  They include the territorial, nationality, 
protective, passive personality and universality principles. The most common and 
accepted principles include the territorial and nationality principles.51 Other principles 
of jurisdiction emanate from customary international law which results from state 
practice and opinion juris. The exercise of jurisdiction in an international as well as 
trans-national context arose due to international and trans-national troublesome 
problems that have to be dealt with.52  
 
In Lotus case,53 it was stated that the primary constraint imposed by international law 
upon a state is that it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of 
another state. In other words, jurisdiction is certainly territorial; a state cannot 
exercise its jurisdiction outside its territory "except by virtue of a permissive rule 
derived from international custom or a convention".54 
 
The territorial principle has been deemed as the least contestable principle and basis 
of jurisdiction as it is the main purpose of the function of statehood and state 
sovereignty.55 This principle refers to the international law doctrine that entrusts the 
state with the jurisdiction over persons and activities within its own territorial 
boundaries.56 In that sense, the state cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond its territory. 
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However, wrongful activities can sometimes be perpetuated and transferred across a 
state's territorial border. A corrupt activity, for instance, may involve actors and 
transactions in different territories thereby, causing the spill over of the 
consequences of a wrongful act from a state's territory to another.57  
 
Subjective territorial principle gives state A the authority over conducts that 
commenced within state A but was completed in State B. 58  Objective territorial 
principle gives state A the jurisdictional right over a conduct which commenced in 
State B but was completed within State A.59 In a situation where the act and its 
consequences have spilled between states, these states may consider themselves 
empowered, on the basis of territoriality or even nationality principle to take 
cognisance of the same offence. 60  While subjective territoriality is rarely 
controversial, objective territoriality is more contentious due to complications that 
may arise as a result.61 Traditionally, in the UK like in some other member states, the 
place of commission of the offence is determined on the premise of the doctrine of 
ubiquity: some state may categorise the act while another may categorise the 
effect.62 In Akehurst's Modern International Law,  a man in state A may shoot across 
a frontier and kill someone in state B; in such circumstances both states have 
jurisdiction.63 Likewise, this principle literally applies to a man who bribes across the 
border of state A to another person in state B.  
 
Oftentimes problems arise when states want to claim concurrent jurisdiction on a 
matter. The issue is now how can there be judgement on concurrent jurisdiction and 
who should regulate when both the interests of the states are at stake? The country 
to whom the offence was committed in its territory has its jurisdiction over the affairs, 
also the country of the offender might as well have jurisdiction upon the offence 
depending on the effect or impact of the offence on the state. A simple example of a 
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concurrent jurisdiction on a case is the case of Ibori,64 where the UK and Nigeria had 
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.  
 
States involved in such cases may have concurrent jurisdictional claims over the 
wrongful acts under the international law principles of subjective and objective 
territoriality. For example, in the Halliburton case,65 a group of corporations on a joint 
venture from America, Japan, and UK amongst other paid bribes to foreign officials 
in a business venture to win a liquefied gas contract. Here, the offence was 
committed by different corporations from different parts of the world and the victims 
of the offence were high level officials in Nigeria.  
 
The present circumstances surrounding the exercise of subjective and objective 
jurisdiction has become murkier as a result of the arrival and existence of the 
internet. Money and trade transactions are carried out online; the Halliburton case 
showed that a bribery scheme can be perpetuated through the use of internet and 
murky online transfers. The arrival of internet present two problems. One, the 
internet means through which the money was transferred, two, complication 
regarding the regulation of the corrupt money transferred (in Halliburton, the bribe 
was transferred through different streams of online transfers). Another example is 
the Statoil case.66 In this case two bribe payments were made by wire transfer 
through a New York bank account. Statoil, a company headquartered in Norway but 
registered as part of US Stock Exchange was subjected to the FCPA for violations 
on the basis that the company was listed on the US Stock exchange and bribe 
payments were made through a New York bank account. 67  The solution to the 
problem of concurrent jurisdiction can be difficult to attain especially when it 
concerns matters of significant state interests.    
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Furthermore, nationality which serves as a mark of loyalty and respect is also 
recognised as a basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction.68 The nationality principle is an 
international law jurisdiction principle that gives every state the jurisdiction over their 
nationals, home and abroad.69 By virtue of this principle, a person possesses certain 
rights and duties; domestic laws and regulations control the acquirement and loss of 
these rights and duties. Assertions on this principle generally revolve around the 
issues of bigamy or offences that threaten national securities.70 However, the rise of 
trans-national crime like bribery of foreign officials and other forms of grand 
corruption have triggered the rate with which extra-territorial jurisdiction is asserted 
on the basis of nationality.71 For example, UK's Bribery Act 2010 makes it an offence 
for a UK national or resident to engage in bribery conduct abroad. This is why 
Brownlie stated that a person, whom the state decides to exercise its prescriptive 
jurisdiction, must have been a national at the time he committed the offence.72 Thus, 
in a sense, the UK law stays within the realms of preceding legal thinking whilst at 
the same time indirectly expanding the effects of its laws on persons and companies 
outside its jurisdiction. Under the nationality principle the active and passive 
nationality principles apply. 
 
1. Active Nationality 
This refers to the state's jurisdiction over conduct of its nationals abroad. For 
example, a genuine link is required to ensue between the state enforcing the law, 
and the person who is the subject of the law. Zerk in his report for the Harvard 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative noted that states regard this principle as 
one of the strongest basis for direct extraterritorial jurisdiction. 73  Chehtman 
expressed his concerns as to the underlying philosophical justifications for the 
principle. He claims that "as a basis for criminal jurisdiction the nationality principle is 
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altogether unjustified as the bar of justice".74 Chehtman also argued that "individuals 
in any given state lack an interest in having that state's criminal laws enforced 
against them or their co-nationals (or co-residents) abroad."75 
 
2. Passive Nationality 
This limb of nationality principle refers to the power of a state to punish an offender 
extraterritorially on the ground that the victim - rather than the perpetrator - is its 
national. The use and existence of this principle is mainly controversial, possibly 
because of the particular challenge it poses to territorial-based systems of regulation. 
As a ground of criminal jurisdiction, this principle has been expressed as among the 
"most contested in contemporary international law".76 
 
The nationality principles provide a more complex basis for establishing jurisdiction 
in a case. This principle is complex because a state can assert jurisdiction over the 
performance of a corrupt activity committed by its nationals abroad, and over the 
victim of a corrupt activity committed abroad. Complexity arises where a corporation 
or person abroad may be subject to two jurisdictions, the state of nationality of the 
corporation where the impact of such offence was felt and where the conduct or 
offence took place. Potential contentions and conflicts arise between the nationality 
principles and territorial principles; it raises the question of whose jurisdiction should 
be asserted and why.  
 
Most corruption cases are potentially subject to multiple jurisdictions - the jurisdiction 
of the giver of bribes and the jurisdiction of the receiver. When subsidiaries of 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are located in countries other than where the 
headquarters are established, jurisdictions of the home state can be asserted based 
on the standing practice of nationality principles in international trade and 
regulation.77 Castel warned that self-restraint should be exercised when using the 
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nationality principle.78 He asserted that the enforcement of the nationality principle 
should be based on the seriousness of the effect of the conduct on the "international 
trade of the regulating state, the significance of the activity and the extent to which 
there is a conflict with the foreign territorial law." 79  Concurrent jurisdictional 
assertions present complications when two or more camps, either based on 
nationality or territoriality principles, are affected. 
 
Under the protective principle, the state has the jurisdiction over actors and course of 
conducts outside the state that affect its crucial interests - interests in respect to 
integrity, sovereignty or governmental functions of a state.80 The principles used to 
prosecute offences which relate to "counterfeiting currency, forgery of official 
documents (such as passports and visas)" 81  are gradually invoked on serious 
corruption cases. An extreme example is a situation where the corruption of foreign 
Head of State may damage state's national policy interests. In this regard, Chaikin 
asserted that the protective principle is, perhaps, not the most appropriate 
jurisdictional premise to justify the law surrounding foreign bribery.82  
 
The passive personality principle is a jurisdictional principle that gives a state the 
authority over actors, and course over conduct abroad where a national of the state 
has sustained an injury. The existence of this principle as a separate basis of 
jurisdiction has been doubted.83  
 
However, under a universality principle, states are given the right to assert 
jurisdiction over extremely serious international crimes wherever they had taken 
place.84 Crimes treated under this jurisdiction are deemed as so offensive and a 
threat to international security and peace. As a result, all states are deemed to have 
a legitimate interest in the prescription and enforcement of this principle. Crimes like 
money laundering, hijacking, slave trade, terrorism, and pirates fall under this 
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principle as they are seen as serious threats to international security and peace. The 
crime of bribery and grand corruption which also greatly distorts security and peace 
are not classified under the universality principle. Rather, enforcements of laws 
related to these crimes are established usually under the nationality and territoriality 
principles.  
 
In a globalised economy, corrupt crimes are often carried out through various 
physical and cyber networks creating a murky chain of links. These links can be 
established in various multiple forms for example, through states internet and 
technological services, and multinational FRUSRUDWLRQV¶ direct dealings with highly 
placed officials. In summary, a bribery operation can attract multiple legitimate 
jurisdictions as a result of the links attached to the activities.  
 
 
2.2.3 Prescriptive, Enforcement and Adjudicative Jurisdictional Assertion 
 
Jurisdiction is said to be one of the most overburdened terms in law as it has a large 
number of meanings, all of which depend on context and many of which are 
overlapping. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is not exempted from this chaos. In fact, 
extra-territorial jurisdiction presents more jurisdictional challenges compared to 
territorial jurisdictional problems. These extraterritorial national laws, according to the 
Harvard Law Review, can come across as direct extraterritorial jurisdiction and/or 
domestic measures which possess extraterritorial implication.85  
 
The notion of state's conduct regulation is based on jurisdictional assertions centred 
on the three branches of government: legislative, executive and judicial. 86 
Enforcement jurisdiction means the capacity of a state to enforce compliance with 
laws, or penalty for breach.87 Prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to the 
                                                          
85
  Zerk (n 73).  For example, imposing requirements on parent companies regarding the 
management of foreign subsidiaries, or placing responsibility on them for any false statements or 
conducts can be termed as a domestic measure with an extraterritorial implication. He further explains 
that a state can assert jurisdiction over its own nationals in relation to the steps taken within the State 
to pay bribe to another State's official whether directly or through a means.  
86
 Michael Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction in International Law' (1974) 46 British Year Book of International Law 
145, 145-147 
87
 Ireland-Piper (n 61) 
29 
 
capacity of a state to legislate in respect of persons - natural or juridical - within the 
territory.88 Finally, adjudicative jurisdiction simply refers to the capacity of courts to 
resolve disputes. 89  In a practical extraterritorial context, Akehurst, in his classic 
essay succinctly distinguished between: 
 
"the power of one state to perform acts in the territory of another state 
(executive jurisdiction), the power of a state's courts to try cases involving a 
foreign element (judicial jurisdiction) and the power of a state to apply its laws 
to cases involving foreign element (legislative jurisdiction)."90 
 
The extent to which these arms of government act in extraterritorial claims cannot be 
compared with territorial claims. In fact, the present usage of jurisdiction cannot be 
compared to its past usage likewise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Florey expanded on 
this by stating that "extraterritorial principle constrains the reach of the laws state 
legislatures may enact." 91 In the light of this statement, these constraints 
automatically extend to the enforcement or prescription of laws respectively by the 
executive or legislature. Due to this complexity, according to Karl Meessen, an 
attempt was made by the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States to split the concept of jurisdiction into several distinct categories in 
order to form a systemic classification. However, he argued, a rigid classification, as 
a 'matter of pure logic' could be acceptable but this does not precisely reveal the 
state of international practise on the subject matter.92  
 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the US 93  serves as a 
representation of the output of various American Jurists on the topic of jurisdiction. 
Although this authoritative source reflects the law from the perspective of the US 
courts however, it presents a dynamic approach to the understanding of jurisdiction. 
It outlines a more restrictive criteria for the jurisdiction to prescribe. It presents that 
state can prescribe laws to conduct which are substantially or wholly within its 
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territory,94 individuals within their territory,95 or "conduct outside that is intended to 
have substantial effects within its territory".96  
 
The Restatement (Third) also includes the power of the state to prescribe jurisdiction 
if one of its nationals is outside the state's territory,97 and certain activities by non-
nationals outside the territory if the conduct someway or somehow causes impact on 
the security or national interests of the state.98 In addition to the above-mentioned 
criteria are the limits that the Restatement (Third) places on prescriptive jurisdiction. 
This law limits prescriptive jurisdiction if it is unreasonable and presents several 
factors in ascertaining its reasonableness. It is essential to note for the purposes of 
this dissertation and the upcoming discussion of the FCPA the degree to which an 
extra-territorial prescriptive jurisdiction can be deemed as reasonable.  
 
According to Troy Lavers, the reasonableness requirement is a preferable limitation 
compared with the "blanket condonement" emphasized in Lotus.99 Lavers stated that 
in instances where "prescriptive jurisdiction is not consented to by other states; 
reasonableness and international comity should play some part in order to maintain 
the sovereign equality of states and reduce jurisdictional conflicts."100 Although the 
Restatement (Third) originates from the US, one of the major active states 
prescribing anti-corruption legislation, it is an invaluable reference where the factors 
of reasonableness can re-engage the limits of international customary principles on 
extraterritorial assertions. 
 
Each state's jurisdiction is characterised by various legal orders, which vary in 
intensity and makeup. The state's authority to subject things, conducts and persons 
to its legal order also varies alike. Likewise, extraterritorial jurisdiction varies in 
intensity and usage. This is why strict and precise systemic categorisations cannot 
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be achieved. 101  Each state is different from others, in terms of the usage and 
intensity of its authoritative power. This reiterates the fact that extraterritoriality is 
also a matter of degree. Crawford calls the degree of extraterritoriality as a matter of 
appreciation102 where different cases cannot be treated alike. Different cases will be 
tested under different elementary notions of fairness and justice common to all 
jurisdictions. Most especially in this world where globalisation is straining to keep 
pace with the traditional notions and principles of jurisdiction, the aspects of fairness 
and justice is pivotal in ascertaining reasonable extraterritorial jurisdiction.103 This 
fairness has to be balanced between developed and developing states in their effort 
to establish their extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
2.3 Justifying Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
 
Several arguments have been made as regards the impact extraterritoriality has on 
the sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of states to decide their matters. This 
section of the dissertation seeks to discuss those conditions under which 
extraterritoriality is justifiable on the basis of its structure and function in international 
law. This section will discuss the justification of extraterritoriality on the basis of the 
principles of jurisdiction and maintaining sanctity in the international realm.  
 
The interdependence and relationship between communities in the international 
sphere serves as a justifiable basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction. The various basis 
of jurisdiction show the possibility of the transfer of conducts and activities from one 
state to another. The transnational nature of business transactions in the 
international sphere, for instance, creates a realm filled with a mixture of different 
legal practices, legal orders, and policies spectacular to individual countries hence 
the need to control affairs across borders. This regulation cannot be actualised 
through a strict adherence to physical territoriality. Meessen significantly identifies 
that the advent of globalisation, transnational trade and establishment of Multi-
national Companies (MNC) undoubtedly created the need for extra-territorial 
jurisdiction because there is a huge imbalance and difference in states' disposition to 
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regulating affairs pertaining to its territory. Glahn and Taublee puts it simply that with 
nearly 200 states in the world today, there is bound to be confusion and problems in 
dealing with potentially 200 different sets of standards and procedures even on 
simple matters such as "necessary travel documents or establishing diplomatic 
UHODWLRQV´ 104  Therefore, extraterritoriality is justifiable due to the reality of the - 
transnational features - of the 21st Century globalised and interconnected world. 
States, especially the powerful states, monitor their citizens, actors and affairs both 
within and without their territories. However, whether specific features of such 
monitoring is to be regarded as legitimate would always be subject of intense 
debate. 
 
International law provides for the justification of extraterritoriality based on the basis 
of jurisdiction. As Harold Maier observes: the assertion of national jurisdiction across 
the boundaries of the acting state has been a "source of continuing debate since the 
development of the territorial state as the principal political unit in the world 
community during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." 105 Territoriality, 
nationality, and passive personality basis of jurisdiction all show the need to protect 
state affairs which arise in form of states' peculiar interests in regulating their sphere. 
Protection of interests and assertion of sovereignty and jurisdiction are inseparable, 
and the principles of jurisdiction helps states to enforce their laws in an 
extraterritorial manner.  
 
The constitutional doctrine of the law of nations is entrenched in the sovereignty and 
equality of states.106 State sovereignty represents states jurisdiction on its affairs 
while equality of states, arguably, represents the equal assertion of states jurisdiction 
in international law. The constitutional doctrine of international law is problematic in 
itself, and its quest to protect the sovereignty of state as well as equality of states 
poses a significant chaos. Ascertaining equality of states is deeply rooted in affirming 
states jurisdiction, but the problem is that states' possess different legal orders, 
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structures, ethics and cultural dispositions. 107  (QIRUFLQJ D VWDWH¶V OHJDO RUGHU RU
REMHFWLYHV FDQQRW EH VHSDUDWHG IURP WKH VWDWH¶V DVVHUWLRQ RI LWV VRYHUHLJQW\ 7KH
dichotomy of upholding states sovereignty and maintaining equality of states is a 
difficult puzzle with no perfect solution.108 In fact, "the history of the international 
system is a history of inequality per excellence". 109  Koskenniemi in his work, 
'international lawyers', rightly alludes that in most periods, mainstream views and 
assumptions have been juxtaposed by typical challenges such as "right of 
sovereignty vs. the interests of an 'international community', international security vs. 
cosmopolitan justice, self-determination and national autonomy vs. international 
rules on human rights, development and environment".110 However, international law 
WLOWV WRZDUGV WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI VWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV UDWKHU WKDQ WKH LQWHUHVWV RI WKH
international community given that these interests are specifically the interests of a 
few elite states who have created international law. This is why Simpson argues that 
equality of states in international law is a farce because it is an interplay of unequal 
sovereign powers (great powers and outlaw states) in the international legal order.111 
The justification of extraterritoriality is not based on the peculiar interests of the 
'international community' but on particular states interest.  
 
Although the historical and philosophical roots of equal sovereignty as discussed 
above is founded on Westphalian principles which symbolises a shift from strict 
hierarchy to equality and which entails a horizontal (rather than a vertical) order 
composed of "independent freely negotiating states." 112  It is evident that this 
horizontal relationship and equality is between great powers while vertical and 
KLHUDUFK\ UHODWLRQVKLS H[LVWV EHWZHHQ JUHDW SRZHUV DQG µRXWODZ¶ VWDWHV +HQFH WKH
assertion that international law is a dialogue of power, and fundamental to this 
dialogue is an uneven application of power to different states. Perhaps nowhere is 
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this better delayed than in the relations of powerful states like the United States, the 
UK and the ECOWAS states discussed in this dissertation. 
 
Integral to the history of international law is the protection of state interests and a 
fostering of assumed legal, material and cultural superiority which is evident in the 
history and recent multiplicity of extraterritorial applications. Examples include the 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996113 and the (Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act). The Helms-Burton Act provides that persons who owned 
property seized by the Cuban government may sue individuals or companies who 
carry out any movement in this confiscated property.114 The Iran-Libyan Sanctions 
Act requires the president to force sanctions on overseas organisations and 
corporations that invest in either Libya's or Iran's oil sector. The Helms-Burton Act115 
and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 116  effectively subject foreign individuals and 
companies to Congress' will, raising serious international concerns concerning the 
legitimacy of third-party sanctions and America's role in international affairs. The 
international community has criticised these acts because they in fact violate other 
states' sovereignty to the extent that both acts prohibit conduct, recognised as legal 
under other sovereign nations' laws, which occur outside of the US Territory.117 The 
United States threatens the use of sanctions against third-parties - individuals and 
companies - to effectuate the state's larger policy objectives.  
 
Close to these examples is the OTC derivatives. European Union (EU) legislators 
and policy makers justify the principles and application of extraterritoriality on the 
need to shield EU derivatives from regulatory arbitrage and systemic risk118 rather 
than provide a balanced and proportional approach so as to ensure equal financial 
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stability and growth. It is obvious that often times, for better or for worse most 
extraterritorial application of national legislations are mainly for the preservation of 
national interests. International law has not provided any consistent framework for 
dealing with the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction partly because of the difficulty 
peculiar to the principle and practice of jurisdiction in international law. As stated 
early in this dissertation, sovereignty has been postulated as a regulation of a state's 
domestic affairs. Therefore, international law possesses the obligation to protect 
states' order which could come in form of policies.  
 
The decision of a state to strengthen its regulatory framework due to its legal order 
and practise is justifiable even if it means the assertion of extraterritoriality doctrines. 
The complication which arises is the legitimacy of specific extraterritorial application.  
It is important to argue however, that the justification of extraterritoriality should not 
be based solely on states' interests but should entail the interest of the international 
community. The interest the international community seeks to accomplish is nearly 
always inconsistent with the principle and practice of equality of states. This is not to 
say that international law should not protect the legitimacy of a state's legal act in the 
international sphere even if the state is the only state to harness its powers to exhibit 
its legal order across borders. The crux here is extraterritorial jurisdiction should be 
µMXVWLILDEOH¶119 beyond just an establishment of the basis of jurisdiction, the purpose, 
process, reciprocity and proportionality must be established in other to ensure 
fairness as argued by Danielle Ireland-Piper.120 
 
Another justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction is the maintenance of sanctity in 
the international realm. To move on, justification of extraterritoriality is a 
demonstration of the turmoil underpinning the oversight regulation and monitoring of 
the efficacy of transnational business relations, amongst others. The issues relating 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction are linked with issues relating to transnational law. 
Transnational law, consists of elements of both international law and national law. 
The interplay of these laws dissolves traditional dichotomies between the two. These 
fundamental changes the way in which the international arena functions. As a result, 
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our interconnectedness have diminished the divide between domestic and 
international law. Assertions of extraterritoriality sit at the crossroads of this divide. 
However, the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a novel concept in 
international law. The various basis of jurisdiction discussed earlier show the 
importance of extraterritoriality. Whether these claims are legitimate claims are 
subject of intense debate as a result of stark controversy and layers of the principles 
of jurisdiction which is deemed as nebulous concept comprising many facets. The 
justification for extending extraterritoriality in combating the bribery of foreign officials 
in international business is an example of a recent area where the basis of 
extraterritoriality is used. Legitimately, it is justifiable as bribery and corruption has 
been established to distort market competition, good governance etc.121 
 
In addition, the fact that the purpose is justifiable does not make the act or the 
enforcement of it justifiable. A justifiable extraterritoriality principle is that which 
possess clear structure and fair framework to the betterment of the international 
community. Combating the bribery of foreign officials and grand corruption in IBTs is 
justifiable however, the legitimacy of the acts and conventions surrounding the 
enforcement of these instruments remains a subject of intense debate in the 
international sphere. Chapter three and four purposes to delve into the legitimacy of 
the present structure of laws regarding combating the bribery of foreign officials in 
international business. The extraterritoriality principle is entrenched in the protection 
of states power and interests and not in the equal exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. The essence of the application of extraterritoriality has not changed in 
international law. As historical extraterritorial application seek to focus on the 
protection of interests like diplomatic immunity and old medieval trade interests, 
newer extraterritorial application in international law also protect states' interests. 
Therefore, extraterritorial jurisdiction is justified on the basis that it allows states to 
regulate the transfer of its domestic affairs abroad. 
 
It is arguable that corruption in IBTs is a primary feature of conducts which disrupt 
the sanctity of the international realm. International business relationships in 
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contemporary times tend towards corruption acts.122 In fact, corruption was deemed 
as a core part of 'business' transaction until, over the last two decades, when it was 
seen as a significant limitation to fairness in trade relations and inhibition to 
economic growth and development.123 The nature of corruption on national level 
makes it impossible to exempt corruption on international or trans-national level. 
These corrupt acts can only be curbed through transnational or international law. 
Some states have employed their regulatory and extraterritorial power to combat this 
transnational disease, and it is impossible to maintain a monolithic theory of 
jurisdiction that all extraterritorial jurisdiction is bad as this will mean the maintenance 
of a charter of freedom for international criminals. 124  Undoubtedly, assertions of 
extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction can also provide an important response to 
developing countries faced with underdevelopment, economic instability and grand 
corruption due to omission or act on the part of foreign nations.125 
 
There is the belief that government comply with international law only if convenient to 
do so and feel free to ignore it otherwise.126 In the case of combating bribery and 
grand corruption in international business, many states have reasonably applied 
national laws extraterritorially, some have aggressively applied their laws across 
borders and others are indifferent about combating bribery of foreign officials for 
various reasons.127 There is the huge debate whether international law is really law 
because there is no strict and structured enforcement framework. The lack of 
structure and consistency in the way extraterritoriality is applied is significantly due to 
the fluid posture of states towards international and transnational regulation. This is 
why the former Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban, lamented that 
"International law is the law which the wicked do not obey and the righteous do not 
enforce."128 International law is plagued with infirmities of overregulation by some 
states and under-regulation by other states. May suggests that such infirmities can 
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only be cured by focusing more on the principles of procedural fairness and the rule 
of law than is commonly done.129 He describes procedural issues in international law 
as a 'vastly underdeveloped field'130 with 'proportionally little attention'131 given to 
'global procedural justice'.132 
 
2.4 Power and Interdependence  
 
Sovereignty in the age of globalisation and capitalism has been a widely contested 
doctrine. Equality of states was a major bedrock characteristic feature of the 
"incident of sovereignty in traditional international legal doctrine"133 and international 
relations. On this doctrine have been built the contemporary mainstream 
developments for a running system of international law. These developments have 
been centred on the enjoyment of reciprocal entitlements. As Oppenheim stated, a 
state comes as an equal to equals in ensuring the Family of Nations. In other words, 
a state demands a certain consideration to be paid its dignity, the retention of its 
independence, and its personal and its territorial supremacy.134 The equality of all 
member-states of all the family of nations is an unchanging equality obtained from 
their international personality. 135  The basis for jurisdiction perfectly creates an 
understanding for the justification of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Under these various 
basis, states possess the power to claim extraterritorial jurisdiction on any subject 
concerning its matters which international law seeks to strengthen to the extent that 
these jurisdictional assertions does not violate international law principles. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the governance of a state's affairs is married with a 
state's disposition to assert its sovereignty and jurisdiction over any matters 
concerning its territory which could be physically or otherwise linked to its territory.136 
These justifications are correct to the extent that they are balanced in the sense that, 
they ensure reciprocity between states. The consistent argument presented in this 
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 As discussed above under the basis of jurisdiction, there are conducts which solely emanate within 
the territory of a state, also there are conducts which emanates from another state but significantly 
impacts other states.  
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chapter has been that although extraterritoriality may be based on customary 
international law and international relations, the use of extraterritoriality over the last 
few decades has been one-sided with little critical eye on the impact these may have 
globally. Balance is crucial in the current world of increased interdependence. 
 
The present application of extraterritoriality takes its root in the sole preservation of 
states interests making extraterritoriality to change in form but not in function. The 
overall analysis of the basis of extraterritoriality represents the potential and actual 




In conclusion, this chapter has argued that for a state to be able to assert its 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, it must possess justifiable and reasonable grounds. Part of 
these ground is the establishment of the bases for extraterritoriality, which form the 
elements of what will/should constitute an extraterritorial jurisdiction. The usage of 
extraterritoriality as discussed in chapter two show that extraterritoriality can be used 
for the protection of public policy, economic integration, economic interest, reduction 
of poverty in the developed world, and upholding rule of law and governance. This 
chapter is important as it sets the scene to the rest of the chapters. It sets as the 
foundation for understanding subsequent chapters. This is because to be able to 
understand the effects the practice of extraterritoriality has on the principles of 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of countries, it is pertinent to start by 
explaining and unravel what extraterritoriality is, what it entails and the issues with 
regards to present practice of the doctrine. 
 
Although the basis of extraterritoriality are established in international law and 
international public law, their origin, usage and enforcement solely rests on national 
governments. The international field has become global and interconnected in every 
form and size especially with the advent of technology, therefore the issues that 
plague one state, most likely will plague others. Powerful states want to regulate 
their territory home and abroad which international law seeks to foster. The problems 
of ascertaining extraterritorial jurisdiction is vast, part of which concern how 
international law can regulate sovereign interests, and many of which concern the 
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variety, vast and nebulous difference in the diverse and sensitive affairs which may 
concern the environment, human rights, health safety, business, economies and 
politics. Corruption in the international system is a very sensitive issue and calls for 
serious scrutiny. Attempts to redress the problem through legislations such as the 
Helms-Burton Act however may have led to the creation of very intrusive provisions. 
 
Critical legal theory generally argues that the structure and logic of law is as a result 
of power relationships. The structure and logic of extraterritorial anti-bribery laws is 
designed in such a way that countries just release their extraterritorial laws into the 
sphere but unfortunately only powerful states possess the regulatory acumen and 
political vitality to dictate the direction of regulation of corruption.  
 
A possible conclusion may be reached that extraterritoriality is created to protect the 
interests of states and not the interest of the international community. The 
interconnectedness of the international society conflicts somewhat with the basic 
principle of protection of national interest. Indeed it is difficult to identify where the 
balance between the two situations should be placed. The question of when and 
where to permit extraterritoriality in the protection of corruption crimes is certainly 
one of such cases. The intension underlining the creation of the principles of 
H[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\ OLHV LQ WKH QHHG WR VKLHOG D VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW ,Q IDFt, international 
relations exists primarily to balance the protection of the interests of states.  
The principle of state equality may be undermined if in the application of sovereignty 
and jurisdictional competences certain states are given more latitude in terms of 
extraterritorial jurisdictional powers. When countries does not apply laws equally in 
international situations this would negatively affect the principle of equality of states. 
The interests of a state in extraterritorial application of its powers must not be 
allowed to destroy the necessary and carefully maintained system of equality of 
states. The two interests can indeed be easily achieved if careful thought is given to 
international regulation. 
 
It is important to avoid the creation of conflict of interest of states in coping with 
problems of an international nature as that will defeat the purpose of international 
regulation. More so the George Orwellelian picture of 'all animals are equal, but 
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some are more equal than others' is unacceptable in today's world and attempts can 
be made to reduce the inequality. 
 
However, the present practice of extraterritoriality in international law concerns the 
protection of interests of certain states rather than the equal protection and 
preservation of the international sphere. One of the hallmark features of a state is its 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competence which international law primarily seek to 
preserve. In other words, to ensure sanctity in international business for example, 
states had to enforce laws across national borders. The problem in the international 
sphere is inseparable from the domestic sphere. Different domestic affairs make up 
the international sphere. 
 
Ensuring sanctity in the international sphere also means ensuring the balance of 
power between states. As stated in this dissertation, the protection of states' 
interests is very crucial in international law. In fact, this protection is justifiable under 
the basis of jurisdiction. However, it is asserted in this dissertation that the fact that 
an interest is politically justifiable does not mean it is validly justifiable in international 
law. International law and international public law only contains certain basis of legal 
principles which in themselves are not enforceable except states adopt these 
principles. The purposes, procedures, proportionality and fairness must as well be 
justifiable. Therefore, this chapter has argued that the present application of 
extraterritoriality in international law only seeks to protect the interests of a few elite 
states without much emphasis on the procedural fairness of the justified national 
interests. Extraterritorial jurisdiction, therefore, sits at the fences of domestic (law 
and politics) and international law. Those fences should be an apex of due process 
and best practice, not a no-man's land bereft of proper adherence to proportionality 




EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE REGULATION OF BRIBERY: EFFECTS ON 




Bribery of foreign officials in IBTs has been identified as one of the problems that 
distorts the international business environment. Corruption has been found to violate 
the sanctity of business transactions. On the one hand, it justifies the need to combat 
corruption as it is an endemic malaise which distorts the efficacy of business. On the 
other hand, the very methods and rules used to combat the problem from the 
perspective of international law must be continually reassessed for efficacy, equity 
and fairness. The usage of extraterritoriality as discussed in chapter two shows that 
extraterritoriality can be used in a positive manner for the protection of public policy, 
economic integration, economic interest, reduction of poverty in the developing 
world, and for upholding rule of law and governance. In essence, the crux of 
international jurisdiction can be of general value to the international community as a 
whole. It appears nonetheless, after critical analysis that the main reason for some 
states to subscribe to combating the bribery of foreign officials is really to protect 
their own economic interests and public policy rather than seek true integration in the 
regulation of bribery and corruption in the international sphere. 
 
This chapter argues that although the present regulatory framework encourages 
every state to fight against the bribery of foreign officials in IBTs, international 
practice of extraterritorial practice appears to be skewed in favour of a few states. 
The chapter argues that the foundations upon which the extraterritorial application of 
regulation of corruption in international business is predicated may need to be 
reformulated to rebalance the existing inequities which would be highlighted. This 
dissertation aims to show that the extraterritorial application of anti-corruption 
regulations seems to have its history in the US protection of its state's interest. 
Though every state should exert its extraterritorial jurisdiction against bribery in IBTs, 
the regulatory system is uneven and stacked with various conventions which are 
inconsistent with one another and different in their applicability to different states in 
the international system. In essence extraterritoriality in this important field is 
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indulged in by only a few state-actors. This is not only troubling to the workings of the 
principle of equality among nations but is ultimately bad for the international effort to 
combat bribery and corruption on a world-wide scale since selective application will 
not rid the international community of this significant problem. 
 
The use of extraterritoriality in combating bribery and corruption in IBTs theoretically 
presents states with the power to be able to regulate their domestic affairs abroad. 
Ideally this would work on the basis of equal competence to regulate and on the 
basis of equality and sovereignty. It also gives a state the authority to oversee its 
dealings abroad thereby strengthening the state's sovereignty and jurisdictional 
competence in its own domestic affairs.  
 
Whilst states' application of their extraterritorial law is important to combat bribery in 
IBTs, developing states still fall far short in their extraterritorial application of bribery 
laws. It was the United States of America that first significantly championed the 
extraterritorial application of its laws against bribery of foreign officials, with the 
obvious need to protect its own self-interest. Subsequently, the US introduced this 
concept to The OECD member states and thereafter, it was introduced to the rest of 
world to exert extraterritorial application on bribery of foreign officials. An important 
question to consider is: Could the sudden use of extraterritoriality in IBTs be used as 
a tool for powerful states to regulate their businesses abroad since their business, 
driven by globalization and technology, need to compete against many others in 
order to gain business abroad? The United States for example, embarked upon the 
formation of the FCPA and its extraterritorial clauses in response to a national 
scandal with serious repercussions on its own economy. 1  A Washington Post 
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editorial correctly addressed the self-interest the United States had in cleaning up its 
business space and the practice of its leading multinationals. It stated: 
³It would have been unfortunate enough to have any American corporation 
involved in this kind of transaction. But Lockheed is not considered, in other 
countries, to be just another American company. It is the largest US defence 
contractor, and it owes its existence to federally guaranteed loans. It is seen 
abroad as almost an arm of the US government. Its misdeeds, thus, have 
done proportionately great damage to this country and its reputation´2 
 
After addressing the shortcomings leading to the Lockheed scandal and sanitising 
the business space, the US continued to increase its dominance and extraterritorial 
applications of laws outside its territories.  
 
3.1 Bribery in International Business Transactions  
 
"Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects 
on societies... It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations 
of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows 
organised crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish"3 
 
Although there is no commonly accepted definition of bribery and corruption, various 
definitions provide a workable framework for the understanding of the concept. 4 
%ODFN¶VLaw Dictionary defines bribery as the receipt or giving any undue reward to 
any individual whose profession relates to the administration of public justice in order 
to influence his behaviour and to cause him to act contrary his duty.5 Denis Osborne 
picks up on this and defines bribe as a reward to pervert judgement or corrupt 
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conduct.6 Religious perspectives, like Islam and Christianity,7 VXEVWDQWLDWH2VERUQH¶V
point that bribery is a conduct contrary to justice and good conscience because its 
UHVXOWV DUH ³XQMXVW DQG XQIDLU´ 8  In addition to these definitions, Article 1 OECD 
defines foreign bribery as "to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other 
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for 
that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in 
relation to the performance of official duties so as to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business."9 Also, the Hong 
Kong Independent Commission against Corruption defines it to be a person's abuse 
of power and authority for personal gain at the expense of other people.10 Peculiar to 
all these definitions is the acknowledgment of the subversive nature of bribery to 
international business. Its rapid permeation and increase in IBT is huge and it greatly 
cripples growth and development on national and international levels.  
 
Bribery has become a global phenomenon recognised for its destructiveness. 11 
Bribery does not stand in isolation but rather creates a race to the bottom, in which 
ethical standards must continually be depreciated to maintain a false 
competitiveness. The bribery conduct is not only relegated to the 'little' administrative 
payments that surround requests for governmental services to be carried out.12 Most 
importantly, it is carried out between multinational corporations and foreign officials 
to obtain huge percentage payments in exchange for high level financial 
connections, ministerial actions, contracts and other senior level benefits.13 Due to 
the high profile deals entailed between multinational corporations and foreign 
officials, bribery is not easy to detect as it usually involves a secretive relationship 
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between two or more people entering into an inappropriate conduct.14 It is much 
more complex to detect as the agreement is often masked through a chain of 
offshore transactions, numerous intermediaries and complex financial 
arrangements.15     
 
In IBT, bribery, which was once perceived as a normal part of business relations has 
now received a great deal of legislative and official attention; bribery has been 
correctly identified as distortive of market competition, violating the rule of law, 
undermining democracy and human rights, eroding the quality of human life and 
fostering organised crime and other corrupt activities such as terrorism and money 
laundering respectively.16 Even though the conduct of bribery has accompanied the 
significant growth in international trade and investment,17 its adverse effects have 
short-changed holistic and sustainable development for mere economic growth.  
  
Bribery in IBTs contradicts the principle of competition. The payment of a bribe which 
results in the securing of an international commercial contract on an unfair basis is 
offensive to the tenets of fair trade practices under GATT and World Trade 
Organisation.18 International bribery enables a multinational corporation to obtain 
illicit and undue business or competitive advantage. The business is secured not on 
the basis of quality, price, or other commercial deliberations or terms but through the 
bribery of an agent and the breach of fiduciary duties to secure the business 
transaction(s). For example, the case U.S. v Weatherford Services, Ltd (WSL) shows 
the unfairness that companies which do not partake in bribe face.19 In this case, from 
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2004-2008, officials at Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola, E.P. 
("Sonangol") were bribed by WSL so as to be awarded lucrative contracts as well as 
have insider information about competitors' pricing in order to be able to acquire the 
contracts from their competitors. 20  Clearly, this conduct is unfair to the other 
companies and parties which do not partake in the act of giving bribe.21  
 
Lack of developed institutions and good governance creates the condition for 
corruption within a state. This is because lack of good governance exists, partly as a 
result of corrupt leadership and where there is corrupt leadership, there is violation of 
the rule of law. This also would often lead to disorderliness and corruption. Indeed, 
the practice of bribery of foreign officials in its nature, shape and form raises legal, 
political, economic, moral and social challenges. On the contrary transparency in 
business transactions would increase effectiveness of operations and would usually 
determine the wealth and investment fate of a nation..22 The growing number of 
cross-border business transactions increases the vulnerability of all states to 
corruption as a result of the connectedness of societies with different practices and 
customs concerning bribery.23 Hence, 6ODXJKWHU¶V24 assertion of the present reality of 
the international legal order, which is that economic globalisation and liberal 
governance have resulted in a transnational regulatory convergence of social, 
political, economic and legal practices.  
 
The problem is generally more hard-hitting on African states. Indeed in many African 
nations as confirmed in the annual Transparency International Index for Corruption, 
corruption is rampant and carried out at an alarming rate. Kenya, for instance, has 




 See Chapter Two, Rider (n 56) 287  
22
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been reported as experiencing the worse state of corruption ever. 25  Veteran 
campaigner John Githongo stated that Kenya is sliding out of control; the publication 
of an official audit found out only one percent of Kenyan government spending and 
only about 25% of a $16 billion government budget could be properly accounted 
for.26 In addition, according to GIABA Report 2010, the percentage of bribery of 
government officials by foreign officials as a corruption technique is significantly high 
across ECOWAS members' states. For example, Nigeria (87.3%), Sierra-Leone 
(85.3%), Cote d'Ivoire (55%), Ghana (56.7%), and Benin (40.0%).27  
 
3.2 The OECD Leadership and Competition Laws 
 
In 1967, The OECD became the key actor in efforts to globalise competition policy 
when its Council adopted a Recommendation concerning Cooperation between 
Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices (RBP) Affecting International 
Trade.28 Corruption and bribery in particular can be aspects of restrictive business 
practices. 7KH5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ¶V request was for the following: first, notification of 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LI DQRWKHU FRXQWU\¶V LPSRUWDQW LQWHUHVWV ZHUH DW ULVN 29  Second, 
cooperation when two or more countries proceed against the same RBP in 
international trade.30 Thirdly, transmission of information and lastly, use of mutually 
beneficial methods of dealing with an RBP.31  
 
3.2.1 The FCPA: Initiator of the OECD Convention of Bribery of Foreign Officials  
 
The FCPA arguably ensured that the OECD Convention on anti-bribery gained 
recognition. Andy Spalding emphasized that the FCPA was designed not only to 
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promote business ethics through healthy competition, but to serve as a tool of 
foreign policy.32 As a result, congress sought to attain comparable prohibitions in 
other developed nations, which ended in the passage of the (OECD) Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention (H.R. 4353).33  
 
The intended purpose of the FCPA was to restore public confidence in the reliability 
of the American Corporation.34 The Act was passed in 1977 as a result of endemic 
increase in international corruption between US multinational corporations and 
foreign officials. 35  A report published by the SEC showed that over 400 US 
companies were involved in over $300 million questionable payments made to 
foreign government officials in their business relations.36 These findings troubled the 
United SWDWHV¶ government who was concerned not only about the immoral 
relationship between US multinational companies and foreign officials, but was also 
concerned about the effect on US reputation and self-interest.37 Ever since the U.S. 
has embarked on the journey of prosecuting corruption and bribery of foreign 
officials, there has been an immense increase in the enforcement of the act. 38 
Tougher enforcement and application of the FCPA emerged shortly after the FCPA 
was amended in 1998 in order to help make U.S. businesses more competitive 
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globally. 39  U.S persons and businesses are prohibited from undertaking corrupt 
conduct which clearly violates the FCPA anywhere in the world.40 These persons - 
natural and corporate - encompasses US citizens, resident aliens and businesses 
created under the US law or with a primary sit of business in the United States.41  
 
3.2.2 Contributions of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
 
Given IBT¶VSDUWLFXODUVXVFHSWLELOLW\WRWKHSUREOHPRIEULEHU\RIIRreign officials, it is 
imperative to mention the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Officials in IBTs.42 The instrument focuses on 
the 'supply side' of the bribery transaction 43  which is also described as active 
bribery.44 The value of such a convention to IBTs is easily demonstrable. Specific 
provisions lend themselves too much support, such as those that require signatory 
states to criminalise the bribery of "foreign officials" 45  FDUULHG RXW E\ PHPEHU¶V
multinational corporations while doing business abroad.46 Article 1 of the Convention 
provides that states should take necessary measures to criminalise bribery of foreign 
officials under its laws. These measures should be taken to criminalise any person 
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 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was signed in Paris in December 1997. Over forty major 
economic powers have ratified the Convention. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (1997), 105-43, 37.I.L.M. 1, < 
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with the intention to offer, promise or give undue pecuniary or other advantage, 
whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official 
or for a third party, in order that the particular official acts or refrain from acting in 
relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business. 47  Particular 
provisions also offer themselves to criticism. The instrument employs the device of 
certain safeguard clauses, which makes the adoption of the standards of the 
&RQYHQWLRQ GHSHQGHQW XSRQ PHPEHUV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV 48  The difficulty with this, for 
example, is that the adoptive disposition of many members to the Convention is 
imbalanced. 49  Some members have exceeded the tenets and standards of the 
Convention, while other members may be aggressive in their adoption and 
application of the Convention.  
 
Thus, the usefulness of the Convention to ensure that member states criminalise the 
bribery of foreign officials in IBTs is evidently limited at best. It is ironic that while a 
few of the members states, such as, the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom are aggressive in their response to actualising the tenets of the 
Convention, other members, are greatly inconsistent in their adoption, application 
and enforcement of the Convention. In fact, other members such as, Japan reveal a 
weaker and less effective effort in meeting the tenets and standards of the 
Convention. 50  It is unclear what the drafter¶s aim to achieve with this provision 
considering that most member states already have their set of values, legal orders 
and a different spirit in responding to the combat against bribery of foreign officials. 
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In other words, the implementation provision arguably does not neatly fit into an anti-
bribery treaty which can ensure uniform and effective treatment amongst member 
states. For the reasons identified above, the apparently acceptable purpose that 
commends states to provide support and scope for economic and community 
integration, especially in matters of combating the bribery of foreign officials is in fact 
thrown into jeopardy.51  
 
3.3 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UN CAC) 2003 
 
The examination of regulation and the application of corruption laws across borders 
is the central theme of this dissertation. The UNCAC is now one of the most 
essential anti-corruption mechanism with global scope of application, which takes an 
approach that deals with both the supply side and demand side of bribery unlike the 
OECD which only deals with the supply side of bribery. Chapter 3 of the Convention 
provides for the criminalisation of the bribery of foreign officials, amongst others.52 As 
of 1 December 2015, there were 140 signatories to the UNCAC and 178 state 
parties. 53  The UN Convention addresses the following topics; prevention of 
corruption, criminalisation and law enforcement measures against corruption, 
international cooperation and asset recovery, technical assistance and information 
exchange.54 The Convention also addresses various forms of corruption such as 
abuse of power, trading in influence, and other acts of corruption in the private 
sphere. 55  The major values of the UNCAC articulated in the preamble to the 
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convention are, to ensure economic development, combat transnational organized 
crime and uphold commitment to the rule of law.56  
 
Various Convention treaties are established to ensure combating foreign bribery in 
international business. The OECD Convention and UNCAC are tools to combat this 
endemic problems in international business. Both the background history and 
development of practice demonstrate a number of pressing problems and issues 
related to the application of corruption law across borders. A number of these 
problems are discussed further in Chapter Four; however, it is imperative to 
introduce them here. Combating foreign bribery is justifiable on the basis of 
jurisdiction as discussed in Chapter two; bribery is detrimental to business efficacy, 
good governance, poverty reduction, rule of law and international interests to protect 
the sanctity of states business. There are three pressing issues that needs to be 
discussed. One of these issues is that the present regulation on bribery focuses 
more on national states regulation which is driven by states' interests (as discussed 
in Chapter Two) rather than international regulation driven by the protection of the 
international community against the perennial problem of corruption. The provisions 
of the Conventions provided in international law are established in such a manner 
that the onus of regulation is based on individual states and their claims of 
jurisdiction on any particular case.   
 
3.4 The Dynamics of Power and Interdependence in the Regulation of 
Corruption in International Business 
 
Power politics is a real influence in the regulation of corruption in international 
business. Although there is a interdependence in the society of nations,  the level 
and nature of this interdependence is starkly unequal as the majority of the powerful 
states are home states for the major corporations and majority of the less powerful 
states are consumers of their products and services. Majority of the powerful states 
were also colonisers of the less powerful states, and in the modern world they also 
possess regulatory competence on a wider scale in comparison to the weaker 
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counterparts. Extraterritoriality is beneficial to all states as they will be able to combat 
foreign bribery in international sphere. However, the setup and framework is created 
in such a manner, advertently or inadvertently, to be regulated by elite states. This 
meant that the sovereignty and jurisdiction of developing states will be interfered 
with. Powerful states also tend to display considerable regulatory acumen. Alejandro 
Chehtman observes: 'extraterritoriality is deeply entrenched in the modern practice of 
legal punishment'.57 In essence it is true that the extent to which states can assert 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is a pivotal issue which sits at the 'very heart of 
public international law'.58 
 
Different scholars have argued that the normative principles of sovereignty might be 
outmoded in a new age of democratization and globalisation. This argument was 
sustained by what was seen as an emergent global structure and policy "animated 
by commitments to markets, civil society, liberal peace and rule of law, untrammelled 
communication, and transnationalism."59 This world-wide public policy takes modest 
account and description of equality as a procedural component of the rule of law and 
democracy and a style of politics, but it is not clearly faithful to the practical and 
functional reduction of inequality in the global sphere. The operation of the doctrine 
of sovereignty has hitherto emphasised the reduction of inequality, and if sovereignty 
is to be displaced as a foundational normative theory of international law, an 
alternative would be needed to manage the resultant inequality among nations.60. In 
the field of the regulation of the bribery of foreign officials in IBTs, like some other 
fields in international law, no such alternative is present yet. The serious problem of 
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3.5 Beneficial v Deleterious Effect of Multiple National Anti-Bribery Instruments 
on the International Community 
 
³&HWHULV SDULEXV LQWHUQDWLRQDO DQDUFK\ DV WR MXULVGLFWLRQ DOORFDWLRQ UHGXFHV
welfare: strict territoriality leads to under-regulation; universal resort to 
extraterritorial regulation through the application of the ALCOA effects test will 
lead to overregulation. Each of these claims is unassailably correct, as long 
DVRQHOHWVWKHFHWHULVSURYLVRGRWKHKHDY\OLIWLQJ´62 
 
The Conventions relating to combating the conduct of bribery of foreign officials 
encourage states to criminalize bribery. The criminalization of this conduct means 
creating and enforcing national laws that possess extraterritorial jurisdiction.63 These 
national anti-bribery laws converge in international space to create multiple 
extraterritorial national anti-bribery instruments. Many states such as China, France, 
Australia, the U.K. and the US are beginning to enforce their extraterritorial laws. In 
this regard, the advent of multiple extraterritorial jurisdiction in the combat against 
the bribery of foreign officials is crucial for a united effort in the world combat against 
bribery and corruption. The US FCPA is the leading national anticorruption 
legislation with other countries joining the bandwagon over the next years and 
decades.     
 
Number one benefit of extraterritoriality is all nations can extend their extraterritorial 
laws to combat the malaise of corruption in the international sphere. So states will 
deal with corruption thereby significantly clearing up a significant problem of IBT.  
States already can adequately monitor the affairs of their nation but the international 
plane can be further secured and would then become a less tolerable space for bribe 
givers and their cohorts.  
 
Different nations have different corruption levels and the impact of corruption on the 
growth and development of nations do vary. The extraterritorial tool can thus, be 
used to coordinate in the fight against corruption wherever the problem strikes. For 
instance, many developing states have a kleptomaniac class running the governance 
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of their states. Any significant contact they have with any state can cause them to be 
extradited or punished under the law of the lands. Anti-corruption laws can however 
be innovatively tailored to mitigate this problem.     
 
The absence of international regulation of bribery impedes good governance thereby 
hurting the most vulnerable 64  as well as leaving the international terrain with a 
perpetual decay. Therefore, in order to curb and mitigate the decay, extraterritorial 
application of national anti-corruption laws remain an attractive option to combat 
foreign bribery and corruption. 65 Transnational crime demands transnational 
governance and the strict application of territoriality principle can lead to under-
regulation of crime; whereas a resort to multijurisdictional assertions of extraterritorial 
regulation may in turn lead to overregulation. Nevertheless, a regulation geared 
towards balance can 'adequately' address the multijurisdictional nature of 
extraterritorial assertions. It is pertinent to allude to Professor Paul Stephan's 
assertion stated above, which conceives a backdrop understanding of the essence 
of this chapter. Indeed - to what extent can extra-territorial anti-corruption regulation 
be tolerated by weaker states? Particularly how does this relate to developing 
countries like ECOWAS states?    
 
3.5.1 Example 1: 
The Enforcement of the OECD Convention: The US FCPA (1977) and its 
Extraterritorial Elements 
 
The FCPA enforcement has been useful ever since its creation. The FCPA 
possesses three key extraterritorial elements which are established in 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78dd-1 to 3 of the Act. First and foremost, section 78dd-1 of the Act made it illegal to 
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bribe foreign officials directly or indirectly in order to retain or obtain business.66 
Secondly, any issuer of securities on a US stock exchange, notwithstanding the 
country of the company, or any officer, director, employee, or third-party agent of 
such issuer or even any stockholder acting on behalf of such issuer, is prohibited 
under section 78dd-2 from using the US mails or any instrumentality of US interstate 
commerce for corrupt act anywhere in the world. 67  For example, a Nigerian or 
Ghanaian company listed on the New York Stock Exchange will find itself subject to 
the FCPA despite the fact that their headquarters and primary origin of business are 
located outside the US. Third, section 78dd-3 provided that non-US persons or 
companies are prohibited from using US mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce or engaging in any other act in furtherance of an offer, promise 
to pay, payment, or any authorization of the giving of anything valuable corruptly to a 
foreign official.68 In order to ensure good record keeping, companies subject to SEC 
reporting requirements to institute and maintain an internal accounting system to 
assure management's control over the company's assets (the internal controls 
provision).69 
 
The usefulness of this act cannot be underestimated. The bribery of foreign officials 
in order to retain or obtain business was made illegal under the FCPA. Paul Gerlach, 
in his testimony, alluded that American scholars and statesmen are often happy to 
state that the passing of the act made the US as the first government to criminalise 
the bribery of foreign officials.70 However, it is important to note that the FCPA (1977) 
is not exactly the prosecutorial champion it is often made out to be. It appears that 
'grease payments', i.e., payments made to enable or speed up 'routine governmental 
action' are basically exempted from the realm of the anti-bribery provisions. 71 
Exempting this form of payment weakens the purpose of the FCPA as the act does 
QRWDGGUHVVWKH³YHU\UHDOGDPDJHFDXVHGE\ ORZ-OHYHOFRUUXSWLRQ´72 Also it cannot 
be said that the Act meaningfully resolves the problem of the American jurisdiction 
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attracting profits of bribery even where it is found to have been given by an American 
interest to foreign nationals. Clearly heavy fines have been imposed in many current 
notable cases but the fines arguably are to the advantage of the US treasury and not 
to the advantage of the developing states which have become preys of such 
corruption.73  
 
After 17 years of the passage of the Convention, not only has there been a 
remarkable progress in its enforcement, there has also been a shift in the level of 
enforcement.74 Initially, only one country - the US FCPA - made bribery of foreign 
officials a crime; but, other member states have joined the bandwagon.75 Arguably, 
there cannot be receipt of bribes without the giving; the enforcement of the 
Convention by world's leading exporting states serves as a major breakthrough in 
turning off "the spigot on the supply side of global corruption".76 As of 2011, almost 
300 companies and individuals have been sanctioned under criminal proceedings for 
foreign bribery with sixty-six individuals sentenced to prison.77  In addition, many 
companies have been subjected to huge fines; one company faced EUR1.24 billion. 
Another 300 investigations are ongoing.78  
 
Nevertheless, enforcement of the Convention is still uneven thereby leading to 
ineffectiveness. Professor Elizabeth Spahn pointed that enacting multi-lateral laws 
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on combating foreign bribery are not the same as effective enforcement.79 After the 
passing of the Convention, not until 2005-2006, there was tiny concrete enforcement 
from OECD parties apart from the United States.80 As at then, most parties were 
reluctant to toughen their enforcements and other parties' governments still 
perceived foreign bribery as legitimate business involvement.81    
 
Coupled with this unevenness is an ever evolving nature of bribery. Sophisticated 
modes of bribery payments have resulted in increased difficulty in investigating and 
prosecuting bribery of foreign officials.82 As a result, some states have been unable 
to withstand the investigative and expensive nature of some covert foreign bribes 
due to inability to muster required adequate resources.83 Nevertheless, the OECD 
and Transparency International quite correctly call on signatories to radically step up 
enforcement of their anti-bribery legislations.84  
  
3.5.2 Example 2:  
UKBA (2010) and its Extraterritorial Elements 
 
The initial statutory criminal law regulating bribery was "'functional', but 'old and 
anachronistic' with 'inconsistencies of language and concepts'"85 leading to a bribery 
law, which was "difficult to understand for the public and difficult to apply for 
prosecutors and the courts".86    
 
Three sections of the Act possess the following extraterritorial elements. Section 1 
concerns general bribery offences. It prohibits the bribery of another person by 
offering, promising or giving of a bribe (active bribery) for financial other advantage.87 
Section 2 concerns the agreeing to receive or accepting of a bribe and requesting a 
bribe (passive bribery) for financial or other advantage. 88  Section 6 creates an 
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offence relating to bribery of foreign public officials in order to obtain or retain 
business or an advantage in the conduct of business.89 Lastly, section 7 of the act 
creates a new form of corporate liability for failure of commercial organisation to 
prevent bribery.90 It is crucial to note that the act employs 'residence' in the UK in 
addition to 'nationality' as a basis for the extension of jurisdiction of the law. The 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigates and prosecutes serious and complex 
bribery, corruption and fraud.91  
 
The UKBA and the FCPA are part of the major solid anti-corruption legislations with 
high level activities in carrying out the OECD objectives.92 These two acts have set 
up a firm foundation for combating bribery of foreign officials through intense 
investigation processes, strict compliance mechanisms and tough enforcement 
measures. However, the differences in both acts, based on their language, practices 
and enforcement dynamics create a division that debilitates jurisdictional 
competence. 
 
The discrepancies between the Acts potentially lead to undefined ambiguity and 
duplicative enforcement. The differences range from definition and language 
disparities, to affirmative defences, to penalties, to exceptions, and to compliance.93 
The business, political, financial, policy and regulatory interests of individual 
countries differ in range and in scope;94 therefore, other OECD member states are 
being compelled to create and toughen their anti-corruption laws and enforcement 
measures. The rigorous campaign to toughen measures or create anti-corruption 
legislations does not equate to consistency in the delivery and application of the 
legislations. In fact, it has been argued that the present model of combating bribery 
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and corruption in IBTs produces procedural unfairness, injustice and a competitive 
spirit to 'lead' in the regulatory sphere. Danielle-Ireland Piper opined that ³Dssertions 
of extraterritoriality are useful in the response to transnational crime, but such 
assertions are often highly politicised and are used by states to further 'unilateral' 
foreign policy objectives.´95 From the look of the enforcement of the US anti-bribery 
laws and the advent of the U.K. FCPA, these Acts clearly are different in the way 
they specifically target the malaise of foreign bribery. They are geared for unilateral 
foreign policy objectives. A law which is able to regulate is able to protect, a law 
which is able to protect will seek further protection as the international terrain 
changes.  
 
The argument made here is that the US government's expansive interpretation of the 
FCPA's jurisdictional reach has yielded inconsistency in the understanding of 
jurisdiction and jurisdictional competence as a result of inadequate questioning of the 
discretion of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) with little deliberation of the law's foreign policy consequences. 
 
3.6 Inconsistency of the various purposes, levels of application and degree of 
enforcement of parties  
 
Under the OECD Convention, there is inconsistency in the purpose, level of 
application and degree of enforcement of parties.96  For example, the US FCPA 
combats the 'supply side' of foreign bribery whereas the UKBA combats both the 
'supply' and 'demand' sides of bribery of foreign officials.97 In addition, the reach of 
these national acts varies with the UKBA possessing more far reaching effect and 
the US FCPA possessing more expertise and experience in the investigation and 
prosecution of foreign bribery. Finally, the presence and active working of these laws 
in the developing world like the ECOWAS states is a recipe for multijurisdictional 
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disaster hence, a common global anti-corruption standards with adequate global 
integration is urgently required.98   
 
IIDVWDWH¶VSXUSRVHLVWRFOHDULQWHUQDWLRQDOEXVLQHVVRIILQFHVVDQWDFWVRIFRUUXSWLRQ
both the giver and receiver of bribes do need to be punished. Having a law that only 
combats a side of a criminal act is almost not useful especially in fulfilling the 
purpose of ridding the international society of bribery. This of course is because 
bribery affects the territory of the giver and receiver. Multinational corporations 
benefit from giving bribes (contracts) while foreign officials benefit from receiving 
bribes (personal gain) to the detriment of the community. The UKBA on the other 
hand criminalises the giver and receiver of bribes. The issue this poses is an 
unusually long arm used in regulating the activities of the persons and corporations 
in the international sphere. The downside of the situation however, is that this 
approach presents a worrisome attitude towards the recent usage and extension of 
extraterritorial act which the international community may need to confront. 
 
3.6.1 Multijurisdictional Manifestations of Bribery Law Enforcement 
 
The likely deleterious effect of having multiple extraterritorial laws in the international 
society of nations is the problem of possible multi-jurisdictional conflict. When there 
is a concurrent jurisdiction on a case, who gets to decide the case and what threat 
does this pose to the system of shared sovereignty and jurisdictional competences? 
On the up side of things a web of extra jurisdictional competences carefully arranged 
between states to cover a particular international problem reduces the space for the 
mischief that is being removed. 
 
Traditionally, a state can only exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over three types of 
activities: activity which occurs within its territory, activities of its nationals, and 
foreign activity fashioned to have an effect within its territory or security.99 Any state's 
application of domestic law abroad is deemed as a violation of international law; 
member states are expected to esteem each other's exclusive authority to regulate 
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conduct within their territorial limits.100 The United States, in the case of the FCPA, 
has increasingly flouted this prohibition while the UKBA possess a great potential to 
perform same as well. Relaxing these extraterritorial prohibitions has been the 
subject of intense debate which has proven to curb corruption however, their breach 
of and inconsistency with the international law norm against extraterritoriality remain, 
and both academics and foreign governments have criticised the tremendous 
increase of the global reach of these anti-corruption laws.101  
 
Enforcement against bribery of foreign officials entails multiple jurisdictions with 
overlapping effects. Multinational Corporations by their nature operate across the 
borders of many states.102 As a result, many jurisdictions might collide in the event of 
asserting or complying with their anti-corruption laws. This collision can result in the 
disruption of the jurisdictional system of the host states where the bribery was 
carried out.103  
  
The Halliburton (TSKJ) case 104  portray the multi-jurisdictional nature of extra-
territorial anti-corruption laws. This case involved nearly a total of twelve 
jurisdictions, with the Department of Justice (DOJ) playing a leading role. Although 
France was the first to investigate the case, there was cooperation from various 
OECD Convention states such as Switzerland, Italy, and the United Kingdom.105 
Other Convention states with possible jurisdictional assertions, like Japan and 
Netherlands, were absent from the list. This case serves as an example to the 
understanding of the possible jurisdictional clash which can ensue in the assertion of 
                                                          
100
 +DQQDK%X[EDXPµ7UDQVQDWLRQDO5HJXODWRU\/LWLJDWLRQ¶ (2006) 46 Va. J. Intl L. 251, 268 
101
 Nico Krisch 'More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International 
Law' in Michael Byers & Georg Nolte (eds), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2003) 135-36 
102
 Stuart Deming, 'Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the Accounting and Record-Keeping 
Provisions of the FCPA' (2006) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 96, 468-470 
103
 Claudius O. Sokenu, 'Commentary: SEC Expands Foreign Corruption Law Beyond Congressional 
,QWHQW¶   :DVKLQJWRQ /HJDO )RXQGDWLRQ  'DQLHO 3DWULFN $Vhe, 'The Lengthening Anti-
Bribery Lasso of the United States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. FCPA' (2005) 
73 Fordham L. Rev. 2897, 2898-2899 
104
 TSKJ is a private limited liability company registered in Madeira, Portugal whose members include 
Technip SA of France, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., an affiliate of ENI SpA of Italy, M.W. Kellogg 
(which became Kellogg, Brown and Root [KBR] after Halliburton acquired M. Kellogg) of the US, and 
JGC Corporation of Japan. Each of this corporations own 25 per cent of the venture. Halliburton Co., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22 (1 Mar, 2005) 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501205000055/0000045012-05-000055-index.htm, 
accessed on 04 August 2015   
105
 Spahn (n 62) 27-28 
64 
 
jurisdiction between multiple states.106 On the one hand, the collision of jurisdictions 
greatly show the gravity and importance accrued to combating the bribery of foreign 
officials in international trade and business.107 In fact, this development threatens the 
potential increase of corruption in the ECOWAS region as it awakens the problems 
of corruption and extortion on the part of high profile officials in Nigeria.108 On the 
other hand, the case exposes the potential power tussle between developed and 
developing countries in their pursuit of jurisdictional assertions. 
  
The US lead role in this case is significant to understanding prosecutorial or 
regulatory competition given the fact that only 25 per cent of the proceeds of the joint 
venture accrues to Halliburton. George and Lacey, and Spahn109 in their works have 
argued that the US leading role is partly as a result of the fact that the US possess 
greater expertise, experience and first class personnel skill in corruption 
investigation, which significantly aids the discovery and investigatory process of the 
scandal.110 In addition, the notification of the US by the French of the bribery conduct 
shows the level of cooperation which exists between powerful OECD member states 
in investigatory and regulatory matters.111 In addition, the UK cooperated with the 
U.S for the extradition of Tesler. 112  Even though the US is the leader in this 
prosecution, various concerned jurisdictions cooperated with the US to actualise the 
purpose of the OECD Convention which is to combat the bribery of foreign officials.  
 
However, the danger of having a country lead in a case can be damaging to 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competence. For instance, the Statoil113 case shows 
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107Jay Holtmeier, 'Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for Measured Coordination Among 
Multiple Enforcement Authorities' (2015) 84 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 497-500; Elizabeth Spahn, 
'International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques' (2009)18 Minnesota Journal of International 
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 Kimberly Anne Elliott (ed), Corruption and the Global Economy (Institute of International 
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 Spahn (n 62) 
112
 Jeffrey Tesler was hired by the Joint Venture to serve as an intermediary between the multinational 
corporations and the Nigerian foreign officials in terms of delivering the bribes. See Wrage (n 65) 77-
78 
113
  Statoil paid Horton Investment a sum of $12.2 million to influence important political officials in 
Iran to grant oil contracts to Statoil. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. 
Statoil, ASA (S.D.N.Y. 16 October 2006) 
65 
 
that a jurisdiction with an upper hand can negate the decision of another jurisdiction. 
In this case, the Norwegian authorities issued Statoil a $3 million fine for trading-in-
influence violations which was a lesser and milder penalty under the Norwegian law 
compared to the FCPA's foreign bribery.114 The US decided that the case was not 
decided properly and that penalties were not adequate, so the US re decided the 
case. Apart from the fines paid by Statoil to the Norwegian authorities, the SEC and 
DOJ immediately opened investigations into the Statoil scandal for breaches of the 
FCPA.115 The DOJ reduced Statoil's penalty of $10.5 million by $3 million due to 
prior fines paid to the Norwegian government. Also, SEC required Statoil to pay 




As national economies have become increasingly interdependent, and enterprises 
have become increasingly multinational, and as technological advances have 
permitted more rapid and accurate international communications,117 nations have 
been seeking to control their domestic affairs across territorial boundaries. This 
chapter has argued that bribery and corruption has pervaded transnational and IBTs 
on a high level and extraterritoriality is a legitimate legal strategy and one of the 
important means of combating bribery in IBTs. It is however, very unclear whether 
there is any coherent strategy to internationalise the practice of extraterritoriality to 
all states so that genuine progress may be made in combating the international 
malaise of bribery and corruption in business.  
 
While the framework in the major treaties discussed above purports to ensure 
economic integration, combating bribery by alleviating poverty, and promoting 'good' 
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 Cease and Desist Order, re Statoil (SEC 13 October 2006) ASA, No. 54599 
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 Statoil (n 113)  
116
 Harms (n 108) 171-175 
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  Azalahu Akwara et al, 'The Role of Regional Economic and Political Groups in the Globalisation 
Process: A Case Study of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (1982-2002)' 
(2013) 9 Canadian Social Science 6, 67-68. The central theme of the theory of integration, (which was 
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scholars in the study of regional integration), the modern state due to technological developments and 
swift increase in industrialisation is "incapable of maintaining economic growth and existing economic 
structures through its own efforts". This theory also premises on the fact that modern states cannot 
solely provide for the needs and aspirations of their citizens and territory because these needs cut 
across national boundaries.  
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business in IBTs, the fact remains that extraterritoriality is currently patchy in 
practice. Practice also shows that the protection of states selfish economic interests 
remain the salient objective for action. Protection of states interests and policy in 
itself is not a bad thing, but it appears that the FCPA and UKBA camouflage national 
interests under the language of anticorruption law. Economic integration and poverty 
reduction of the developing world would require a wider promotion of extraterritorial 
powers by the developing states and the strengthening of the rule of law therein. The 
international framework for development of extraterritorial application of 
anticorruption rules deserves dedicated attention to conform to the true 'international' 
and common interests. As a result, this present regulatory framework is arguably 




DOES EXTRATERRITORIALITY UNDERMINE THE PRINCIPLES OF 




This chapter critically examines the effects of the practice of the doctrine of 
extraterritoriality on states within the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) region. The issue this dissertation will examine is how/why the stance of 
the present extraterritorial regulatory framework of corruption in the international 
realm tilts toward the interests of certain elite states. Through the interpretation of 
cases against certain high profile politically exposed persons like James Ibori, Buruji 
Kashamu and Dick Cheney, this dissertation will attempt to show the power play 
between developed and developing countries regarding the regulation of the malaise 
of corruption in IBT. The major issue to be discussed regarding these cases is that 
the recent extraterritorial application of national laws on corruption shows that whilst 
western states are swift to enforce their extraterritorial jurisdiction on developing 
states, they both advertently and inadvertently resist the attempts of developing 
states to exercise their extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
 
In order to fulfil this purpose, this chapter will briefly define the meaning of the word 
extraterritoriality. Thereafter, the problems and prospects of one of the leading anti-
corruption regulatory frameworks in IBTs - the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development on bribery of foreign officials in international business 
(the OECD Convention) will be identified. This dissertation will then explain the 
purpose, nature, and role that the ECOWAS community plays in curbing the bribery 
of foreign officials and other forms of corruption globally. Finally, the dissertation will 
discuss the practice of extraterritoriality and its impact on the sovereignty and 
jurisdiction of weaker states. The dissertation work will conclude that the present 
framework is unfair and that it includes engraved regulatory inequities which can be 
circumvented through establishing a universal jurisdiction framework where the 
equal exercise of states' sovereignty and jurisdiction over matters concerning its 




The interconnectedness of economic and business transactions in the face of 
diversity has been a major feature of the 21st century global village. Globalisation 
dictates closer relations and interconnectedness of regulations. This is probably why 
it has been stated that an important goal of the US-$IULFD/HDGHUV¶6XPPLWZDV WR
strengthen and expand US-Africa economic relations and engagements.1 In order for 
economic relations to be strengthened, good governance has to be put in place by 
the ECOWAS community. Developed states of the West appear to be settled on the 
policy of assisting in shoring up the regulatory framework of developing states. On 
the other hand, for there to be good governance, the international principles of 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competence needs to be strengthened. The type of 
strengthening described here includes and entails guarding the territory from 
external intrusion. Good governance and sovereignty must work in tandem with 
globalisation. In this sense, although globalisation is inevitable, an inquiry into the 
fairness of its operation in a unidirectional manner and against the sovereign 
interests of developing states needs to be carried out. Indeed as countries engage in 
close interrelationship on matters of goods, services, trades, business, man power, 
technology and communication, closer attention needs to be paid to the influx of 
various extraterritorial laws. The excessive reaches of these legislations may have to 
be nipped in the bud.  
 
Developed countries are usually engaged in providing technological, energy and 
infrastructural services to developing countries. At the same time, developing 
countries allow investments by these various multinational corporations.2 As a result 
                                                          
1
 Wilson Center, 'The U.S.-$IULFD/HDGHUV¶6XPPLW2QH<HDU2Q3URJUHVV&KDOOHQJHVDQGWKH:D\
Forward for Economic Relations' (10 September 2015) < https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-us-
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10 September 2015 
2
 On 23rd May 2014, Ms. Penny Pritzker (The United States Secretary of Commerce) stated that 
Nigeria now tops the list of the investment for American investors. Recently, over $480m power deal 
was signed. See Crusoe 2VDJLH µ1LJHULD 1RZ 86¶ 7RS ,QYHVWPHQW 'HVWLQDWLRQ 6D\V &RPPHUFH
6HFUHWDU\¶This Day Live, 23rd May 2014) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-now-us-top-investment-destination-says-commerce-
secretary/179209/> accessed on 14 August 2015; Also, five European Union Member Countries- 
France (38 per cent), Germany (8 percent), Belgium (8 per cent) and the U.K.(31 per cent) accounted 
IRURYHUSHUFHQWRI WKH(8¶VVKDUHRI)',VWRFN LQ WKH6XE6DKDUDQ UHJLRQRI$IULFD See Amy 
Copley, Fenohasina Maret-5DNRWRQGUD]DNDDQG$PDGRX6\µ7KH86± $IULFD/HDGHUV¶6XPPLW$
)RFXV RQ )RUHLJQ 'LUHFW ,QYHVWPHQW¶ Brookings, 11 July 2014) 
<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/07/11-foreign-direct-investment-us-africa-
leaders-summit> accessed on 11 July 2015 
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of this symbiotic relationship, legislation has become fluid across borders but it 
appears to come from abroad into Africa and not vice versa. The purpose of foreign 
legislation is to ensure optimum protection of national and political interests of certain 
countries. The aggressive pursuit of these interests can cause powerful governments 
to freely create legislations that are intrusive. It is argued here that recent anti-bribery 
legislations are an example of this intrusion. Foreign anticorruption legislations have 
been criticised for their intrusive nature. Therefore, as the territory of ECOWAS 
states are fertile for construction, development and exploration, especially in the 
sectors of oil, gas, gold, diamonds and energy, the ECOWAS community needs to 
pay significant attention to the creeping effects of those laws that have the potential 
of diluting the sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of the member states. The 
West has paid rapt attention to the effects of foreign bribery on their business by 
creating their own respective extraterritorial laws.  ECOWAS community states may 
need to strengthen their own community laws not only to adequately protect their 
territories from corruption as well but to also protect against excessive external 
intrusion in their legislative spaces under the guise of extraterritorial legislation from 
outside the region. It is significant to note that the West has experienced little or no 
attempt at extraterritorial application of laws from the ECOWAS region. They have 
indeed experienced little problems in this direction from anywhere else because they 
pay close attention to the principles of jurisdiction and sovereignty that are the 
bedrock of democratic states.  
 
It is pertinent to assert that this dissertation is not about denying the significance of 
extraterritorial application of national anti-bribery laws. The study also is not about 
underrating the importance of anti-corruption laws. However, it is important to point 
out that some of the emerging legislation from a few western states in the anti-
FRUUXSWLRQ ILHOG GHHSO\ FKDOOHQJH RWKHU VWDWHV¶ MXULVGLFWLRQ DQG VRYHUHLJQW\ GXH WR
their utter intrusive nature. The FCPA and the UKBA are significantly relevant to 








4.1 Involvement of the ECOWAS Community in the Global Fight against 
Bribery and Corruption 
 
According to the Business Dictionary ³JOREDOLVDWLRQ LV VLPSO\ GHILQHG DV Whe 
worldwide movement toward economic, financial, trade and communications 
LQWHJUDWLRQ´3 It implies the opening of nationalist and local views to a broader outlook 
of an interconnected and interdependent world with free transfer of goods, capital 
and services across national frontiers. 4  Harrell and Woods provide a significant 
DVVHUWLRQWRWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIJOREDOLVDWLRQ7KLVLVWKDWJOREDOLVDWLRQLVD³SURFHVV
of increasing interdependence and global enmeshment which occurs as money, 
people, images, values and ideas flow ever more swiftly and smoothly across 
QDWLRQDOERXQGDULHV´5 For instance, the dealings of multinational corporations in the 
global village represent an example of the forces of globalisation. Also, the 
operations of these corporations contribute to the increasing process of globalisation. 
Although these definitions happen to paint globalisation as a process which fosters 
development through interdependence,6 however the process of globalisation has 
been criticised as a process, which acFRPPRGDWHV DQG IRVWHUV WKH ³VXUUHQGHU RI
SRZHUWRWKHFRUSRUDWLRQV´7 DQGNHHS³SRRUHUQDWLRQVLQWKHLUSODFH´8 The global fight 
against foreign bribery is the global regulation of actors ± the giver and receiver of 
bribes. Most giver of bribes are MNCs while most receivers are officials of 
developing states. It is pertinent to state that the US can mobilise coercion 
mechanisms that are not available to weaker actors like community groups. Actors 
with large markets can impose trade sanctions.9   
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 7KH %XVLQHVV 2QOLQH 'LFWLRQDU\ µ:KDW LV *OREDOLVDWLRQ"¶
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/globalization.html accessed on 18 July 2015 
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5Samuel M. Makinde and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalisation, Security, 
and Governance (Routledge, 2008) 3 
6
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The globalisation of business cannot function without global business regulation.10 
Hence, the clamour to regulate the bribery of foreign officials in IBT is 
understandable as it impedes fair competition as well as distorts economic growth 
and development.11 The US in particular takes the lead in the global fight against 
bribery and corruption so as to mitigate its impact on IBTs.12 Previous laws on global 
business regulation provide a history of the relegation of least developed and 
developing countries on the regulation ladder.13 This attitude has crept into the global 
regulation of foreign bribery in IBTs. For the process of globalisation to function, 
regulation is essential, hence global business regulation is integral to the 
preservation of business globalisation.14 Globalisation has been considered as a tool 
IRURUGHULQJWKHVWDWHVDQGSHRSOH¶VOLYHV15 For the purpose of this dissertation, this 
ordering can be defined as the regulation of global business through the creation of 
laws. An example of this regulation is that of the bribery of foreign officials in IBTs.     
 
Developing countries see a precarious uncertainty in regulation of business. For 
now, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in IBT, 
as explained in chapter 3 of this dissertation, is a guiding framework to various 
legislations on the bribery of foreign officials in IBTs. The negotiating power and 
influence of developed countries and economies on OECD operations dwarfs the 
influence of many developing countries. This brings about continual opposition to 
vigorous investment as a WTO agenda item. However, developing countries prefer 
to have their say within WTO rather than OECD where they are less represented.16  
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Corruption is one of the major debilitating issues facing the ECOWAS community. 
Corruption is not only facilitated within the community but multinational entities 




The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa 
(GIABA) was established by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government in the year 2000.17 GIABA 
was created in response to the fight against money laundering. This institution is 
responsible for facilitating the adoption and implementation of Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) policies. Although 
there is no institution specifically created to govern the aspect of bribery of foreign 
officials, all the institutions under the domain of GIABA seek to deal with foreign 
bribery in one way or the other. This is because the act of foreign bribery, more often 
than not, has a direct relationship with other forms of corruption, especially money 
laundering, terrorism, and drug trafficking, amongst others. 
 
Essentially, GIABA is responsible for "strengthening the capacity of member states 
towards the prevention and control of money laundering and terrorist financing"18 
within the ECOWAS states. In addition, apart from member states, GIABA grants 
Observer Status to African and non-African States, as well as Inter-Governmental 
Organisations, which supports its aims, actions and objectives. These include, 
various organisations such as the Central Banks of Signatory States, UEMOA, 
regional Securities and Exchange Commissions, Banque Ouest Africaine pour le 
Development (BOAD), the French Zone Anti-Money Laundering Liaison Committee, 
the African Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Interpol, WCO, 
the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the European Union.19 
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Recently, GIABA's Action Group conducted a research on the nexus between 
corruption and money laundering in West Africa.20 The purpose of this dissertation 
was to better understand the connection between corruption and money laundering 
so as to enhance the implementation of international and regional AML standards in 
the region.  
 
It is, therefore, clear to see that ECOWAS displays an appreciation of the problem of 
corruption within the region. The institutional provisions designed for AML also 
indicate an independent assessment of the legislative deficiencies and concerns of 
the region. It is argued here that it is in this manner that every region and country 
should first be allowed to deal with the problem of bribery and corruption. However, 
this can be problematic because some countries are reluctant to enforce their bribery 
laws, whilst other countries are indifferent about tackling the crime.21  
 
4.2 US Extraterritorial Anti-Bribery Jurisdiction in Relation to Nigeria 
 
Nigeria is one of the ECOWAS members plagued with corruption and its serious 
efforts to tackle corruption have been hampered by various challenges such as lack 
of political will, inadequate infrastructure and corrupt government persons. If the U.S 
and UK were not rigorous in their pursuit of curbing corruption in international 
business, the international business community would have been greatly infested 
with corrupt activities. However, the rigorous enforcement of these laws may be said 
to intrude upon the sovereignty and jurisdiction of developing countries. The intrusive 
rate is so high that even the slightest link with the UK or the US is capable of 
bringing ECOWAS citizens under these jurisdictions. This dissertation intends to 
show through the cases below the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the 









 See Chapter Three, Murphy (n 18) 
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4.2.1 The Ibori and Buruji Affairs: Proceeds of Cooperation and Confrontation in 
Exercise of Transnational Jurisdiction 
 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is permissible under international public law when a 
conduct affects the citizens, nation, or interests of the nation irrespective of who 
commits the criminal conduct or where it was committed. These jurisdictional basis 
are nationality, universality, territoriality and protective principles.22 
 
The Nigerian state is a federation consisting of 36 states and a Federal Capital 
Territory.23 Nigeria's tussle with bribery and grand corruption in its entire axis and its 
recent attempts to strengthen its extraterritorial jurisdiction are some of the more 
infamous facts of current discourse on bribery and corruption.24 The suspected scale 
of the applications of extraterritorial laws on foreign bribery cases which occur in 
Nigeria is startling. There have been little or no improvements in Nigeria's capacity to 
tackle its bribery cases in the sense that cases which entail the performance of 
bribery conduct between multinational corporations and the Nigerian government 
officials are nearly exclusively decided by the US SEC and DOJ, or the UK's Serious 
Fraud Office.   
 
Two cases of extraterritorial investigation and exercise of judicial jurisdiction typify 
the uneasy state of cooperation between Nigeria and her closest developed state 
partners in political and economic terms. These are the Ibori25 and Buruji26 cases. 
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 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides in s3(1) that there shall be 36 
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Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Political Culture of Corruption and Cleanups in Nigeria' (2014) 8 
Central European University Political Science Journal 3     
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Nigeria' (Department of Justice, 23 July 2012) <http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-
75 
 
This dissertation will discuss these before it delves into some other leading 
convictions which were based on facts that occurred in Nigeria but employed 
criminal jurisdiction being exercised abroad, principally in the US. 
 
With the way America has summoned the extradition of various Nigerian officials like 
Buruji Kashamu, 27  and the UK summoned the extradition of James Ibori, and 
eventually getting him into Britain via an arrest in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
there is clearly a political will to increasingly exercise US and UK jurisdiction over 
Nigerians in high office. The pertinent question then whether such exercise of 
jurisdiction can happen the other way round.  
 
The call for the extradition of the Nigerian Senator Buruji Kashamu28 was one of the 
most controversial extradition calls made in recent history. For over 20 years, 
Senator Kashamu has allegedly committed various grand offences, including drug 
dealing and other corrupt activities. Consequently, he was labeled as a drug king-pin 
in the US. As a matter of fact, his role as a drug baron was scripted into a popular TV 
series 'Orange is the New Black'.29 The request for his arrest and extradition led to 
much controversy within the Nigerian legal, political, and social arenas. The crucial 
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extradition to the United States. See µ&RXUW WR5XOHRQ.DVKDPX¶V([WUDGLWLRQ 3URFHHGLQJV$JDLQVW
-XO\ ¶ This Day Live, 25 Jun 2015) http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/court-to-rule-on-kashamu-s-
extradition-proceedings-against-july-1/213098/ DFFHVVHG RQ  -XO\  µ1'/($ %DWWOHV %XUXML
.DVKDPX $JDLQ¶ The News, 22 September 2015) http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2015/09/ndlea-





question here was whether the US possessed the extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
request extradition of an µHOHFWHG¶ Nigerian senator to the US 
 
It is however clear given the gravity of the allegations against Buruji Kashamu, that 
the US possessed extraterritorial jurisdiction over him, even though he was in 
Nigeria.30 The offender was in essence a fugitive from justice who escaped the 
United States for the comfort of his own country. The basis of this jurisdictional 
power can be classified under the territoriality principle which provides for a state to 
have jurisdiction on any offence the facts of which ensued within the territory of the 
state.31  
 
The greatest short coming in the conduct of affairs by the United States, however 
was its refusal to present adequate evidence of the crimes he was accused of and 
that were linked to him. Indeed, ascertaining the existence of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is very much based on following due process. The process through which 
the US is ascertaining her jurisdiction in this case is questionable, because the 
process does not only show a bias to benefit the interest of the US, it shows the 
stark unfairness in the regulation of corruption. For there to be an extradition, the 
requesting state must provide documents which include a request for extradition. In 
this case however, the documents provided did not include a request from the 
American government. The US officials also had perpetuated prosecutorial 
wrongdoing as stated by the U.K. When this fact came to the attention of a British 
court, they criticised the US government for choosing to suppress the report, and 
punished US by annulling an order that had earlier been made against Kashamu.32    
 
The Ibori case is another example of the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
applied to criminal conduct. The jurisdiction in this case is concurrent. Ibori had 
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laundered Nigeria's money but was acquitted in the Nigerian criminal system. 33 
However, when he fled to the UAE, the UK extradited him for the same offence and 
he was prosecuted. James Ibori was both a Nigerian citizen and a UK citizen, 
therefore, the UK had jurisdiction over him. The UK exercised its extraterritorial 
jurisdiction on the basis of nationality. Scotland Yard had been investigating Ibori's 
case since 2007 over suspicions that he systematically funnelled Nigerian state 
funds into his bank accounts and laundered tens of millions of pounds in London via 
offshore firms. Recently, it was stated that Bernard Hogan-Howe (head of the 
London Metropolitan Police) will face examination from the UK parliamentarians over 
assertions that Scotland Yard officers investigating James Ibori were engaged in a 
deliberate attempt to cover-up.34 There have been claims by Stephen Kamlish QC of 
µFRPSHOOLQJ¶ IDFWV RI D FRUUXSW activity which ensued between police and private 
investigators employed by Ibori, who is serving a jail sentence in London.35 These 
investigators allegedly rewarded the officers up to £20,000 in order to possess 
access to inside information about their investigation.36  
 
In addition, charges against Bhadresh Gohil, the lawyer who made the allegations of 
bribery against the Met Police officers, were immediately cleared after the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) was forced to release papers it originally held did not 
exist.37 The CPS will be forced to face serious questions and scrutiny over the cover-
up. Perhaps, more disturbing LV WKH DOOHJDWLRQ WKDW WKH 8.¶V 'HSDUWPHQW IRU
International Development (DFID) financed the Met investigation of Ibori, even 
WKRXJK WKH GHSDUWPHQW KDG LQYHVWHG KXJH VXPV LQ ,ERUL¶V EXVLQHVVHV38 The DFID 
would be able to receive £25 million from -DPHV ³,ERUL¶VDVVHWZKHQSURFHVVHVRI
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seizing them were complete.´39 The DFID denied the accusation of conflict of interest 
in the issue. Even though the DFID admitted IXQGLQJWKHHQTXLU\LQWR,ERUL¶VFDVHDQG
earlier on funding some business contracts and transactions with him. However, 
DFID claimed all these do not sum up to a conflict of interest.40 It is pertinent to state 
that this evident conflict of interest cannot be so simply dismissed or minimised by a 
sector which had at least on another incident wrongly exposed whistle blowers about 
grand corruption in Nigeria relating to its ventures and activities in Nigeria. Mr Gohil 
ODPHQWHG³,ZDVDZKLVWOH-blower and instead of investigating what I had uncovered 
DQGSXWIRUZDUG,ZDVSHUVHFXWHG´41 
 
Extradition treaties are of course meant to be beneficial to the parties but often 
times, they are usually beneficial to the stronger states. An example of this may even 
be seen in the criticism of the extradition of four NatWest bankers from the United 
Kingdom to the United States.42 
 
The rigorous pursuit and request of Kashamu (even after he had been tried twice) 
shows the tenacity with which a stronger state pursues a high official in a 'weaker' 
state whereas, on the other side of the coin it is rare and difficult for a 'weaker' state 
to summon an extradition of a high-ranking official in a 'stronger' state.  
 
Examples of trivial responses given by stronger states in their quest for 
extraterritorial application of weaker VWDWHV¶ national law undermines the sovereignty 
and jurisdictional competence of weaker states like Nigeria in the regulation of 
corruption in the international sphere. This is evident in the Halliburton case 
discussed below. 
 
In the case of Halliburton, the Nigerian government requested the extradition of Dick 
Cheney due to his involvement in the popular bribery scandal operated by the TSKJ 
joint venture with Nigerian public officials. Clearly, the Nigerian government 
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possessed the basis to employ her extraterritorial jurisdiction on the case based on 
territoriality principle. The territoriality principle provides for the authority of a state to 
enforce its laws on corrupt conduct performed in its territory. In this case, the TSKJ 
bribed Nigerian officials with billions of dollars in order to procure a massive oil and 
gas contract. Needless to say, it has been agreed by scholars that corruption erodes 
trust in governance and is both detrimental to the social, economic and political well-
being of the country.  
 
It is in conformity with the arguments of this dissertation that when the Nigerian 
government requested the extradition of Dick Chene\ &KHQH\¶V ODZ\HU 7HUUHQFH
2¶'RQQHOO VWDWHG WKDW DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ ZDV FRQGXFWHG E\ 8QLWHG 6WDWHV IHGHUDO
SURVHFXWRUVDQG³IRXQGQRVXJJHVWLRQRIDQ\LPSURSULHW\E\'LFN&KHQH\LQKLVUROH
as WKH &(2 RI +DOOLEXUWRQ´43 The US did not cooperate with the nation's quest to 
further investigate one of the biggest bribery scandals of the 21st Century. Clearly, 
the suggestion is that once the US government agencies take a contrary view about 
an allegation, there will be a lack of cooperation even in a case of concurrent 
jurisdiction over a particular investigation. Unfortunately, this kind of luxury eludes 
weaker states in high profile cases and they are often bullied into cooperation by the 
diplomatic might of the United States. This situation undoubtedly undermines the 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of requesting states from the ECOWAS 
region.  
 
Consequently, challenges to the traditional notion of international law systems of 
sovereignty and nationality principles of jurisdiction can be seen in increasingly 
varied degrees, depth and density of rules propagated by international governmental 
organisations. These organisations are becoming more insistent in relation to 
individual sovereign states both in rule creation and in execution. Administrative 
agencies such as the SEC, DOJ, SFO, national courts, and possibly even legislative 
bodies are increasingly functioning as parts of enforcement and cooperative 
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regulatory systems, and no longer solely as province based national institutions.44 
What this means is that the Nigerian Justice system, on the basis of territoriality 
principle, has the right to summon Dick Cheney for investigatory purposes on their 
engagement with the bribery of the Nigerian officials. The chances of this request 
being granted are slim, as it is in the history of the American justice system to decide 
cases relating to its territory or persons. The present regulatory framework in the 
enforcement of extraterritoriality on corruption tilts toward the protection of the 
interests of few elite states, and this in turn undermines the authority of the states to 
regulate its affairs and contribute to curbing corruption in the international sphere.  
 
Furthermore it may be said that the present framework gives more powerful states 
the exclusive power to decide the intensity, degree and extent of the application of 
extraterritoriality in corruption cases. In other words, the effect of this on the 
international system is biased towards the protection of a few elite states' interests. 
This skewed protection of the interests of specific elite states does not encourage 
regulatory co-operation and integration between developed and developing 
countries. This dissertation asserts that a universal jurisdictional approach to tackling 
transnational corruption would ensure the equal exercise of state's jurisdiction over 
bribery and corruption whilst upholding the landmark principles of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction based on equal statehood in international law.     
 
4.2.2 The case of Halliburton/TSKJ  
 
It is important to highlight some other leading investigations and cases which have 
yielded much fruit in terms of fines and convictions in favour of the United States. 
The particular cases discussed here cover a decade-long scheme to bribe Nigerian 
government officials to obtain Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) 
contracts to build Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)45 facilities on Bonny Island. TSKJ46 
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was a four-company joint venture (JV) that was awarded four EPC contracts by 
NLNG between 1995 and 2004. NNPC was the largest shareholder of NLNG (49%). 
There was conspiracy amongst the partners and others to violate the FCPA by 
bribing a range of Nigerian officials; a sum of $180 million was given in exchange for 
lucrative contracts.47 In related proceedings, U.K. Citizens, Wojciech Chodan and 
Jeffrey Tesler were charged with participation in the bribery scheme in an indictment 
unsealed on 5 March 2009. According to the indictment, Chodan was a former 
VDOHVSHUVRQDQGFRQVXOWDQWWR.%5¶V8.VXEVLGLDU\ZKLOH7HVOHUZDV hired in 1995 
as an agent of the JV. According to the indictment, Tesler48 was the agent hired to 
bribe high-level Nigerian government officials; he was paid $132 million to use to 
bribe these officials. Allegedly, Tesler wire transferred bribe payments to or for the 
benefit of various Nigerian government officials, NNPC, NLNG, including officials of 
the executive branch, and for the benefit of a political party in Nigeria. 
 
A penalty of $579 million fine was declared, with KBR to pay a $402 million criminal 
fine and parent, KBR Inc. and former parent, Halliburton, jointly agreed to pay $177 
million in disgorgement of profits in a related SEC proceeding (not to Nigeria). An 
independent compliance system was assigned to monitor and review the design and 
implementation of KBR's compliance program for three years, with adequate report 
to KBR and DoJ.  
 
4.2.3 SEC v ABB49 
 
An enforcement action was filed against ABB Ltd, a company headquartered in 
Switzerland. This company known for its provision of power and automation 
technologies was said to have violated the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. It 
happened that ABB's US and foreign subsidiaries offered bribes of $1.1 million to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(which became Kellogg, Brown and Root [KBR] after Halliburton acquired M. Kellogg) of the US, and 
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Nigerian government officials, in order to assist ABB to obtain and retain business in 
Nigeria. Although no precise activity on the part of ABB or its subsidiary is alleged to 
have ensued in the United States, ABB was charged for violating the FCPA's anti-
bribery provisions of Section 30A of the (Securities Exchange Act of 1934). This 
case reiterates the concern that the U.S law enforcement bring "such legal action to 
bear against foreign nationals and foreign corporations for conduct taking place 
abroad". 50  Indeed the main justification why President Jimmy Carter signed the 
FCPA into law was to curtail the capacity of US business interests to bribe foreign 
officials to retain and secure business.51 Originally, the Act was only applied to the 
US domestic concerns; Congress was wary of applying the FCPA even over 
"subsidiaries of American Corporations", 52  much less completely foreign-owned 
corporations, their subsidiaries, and even their agents simply because of the 
"inherent jurisdictional, enforcement and diplomatic difficulties".53 The ABB's case 
only had a minute contact with the FCPA, and the FCPA decided to fine the 
company a sum of $5.9 million dollars in disgorgement and prejudgement interest, 
including a $10.5 million penalty for the offence of bribery.54 The FCPA's jurisdiction 
on ABB case greatly interferes with the sovereignty of the Nigerian jurisdiction. 
Nigeria should have decided this case. Clearly, recent enforcement action indicates 
the SEC's dedication to aggressively use all viable legal premises to resolutely 
enforce the FCPA.55 
4.3 The US Extraterritorial Anti-bribery Jurisdiction in Relation to Benin   
The Republic of Benin is one of the Francophone, ECOWAS states. It is considered 
one of the most stable democracies in Africa. Benin has undergone immense 
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economic and political changes in recent times.56 However, economic transformation 
has occurred more unequally than political transformation. Although the basic 
institutional structure for a market economy has been progressively strengthened, 
the economy remains dominated by the informal sector. 57  The government's 
dedication to fighting corruption and attracting investment has resulted in a number 
of regulations, laws and measures to develop the business climate, although several 
obstacles to attracting foreign investors remain. The most important obstacle, 
according to many observers, is the existence of widespread corruption in the 
country - both petty corruption (in form of facilitation payments and small bribes), and 
grand corruption (government, profitable contracts). Despite this, there have been 
encouraging developments in relation to inward investment and some progress in 
tackling corruption in Benin. Institutional platform setup to fight corruption is very well 
established and the nation's strategy to curb corruption has been praised by various 
international observers.58  
Business executives rated the diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or 
groups due to corruption a score of 2.5 on a 7-point scale (1 being 'very common' 
and 7 'never occurs').59 They also rated favouritism of government officials when 
deciding companies and contract a score of 2.8 on a 7-point scale (1 being 'always 
show favouritism' and 7 'never show favouritism').60 The World Bank¶V Enterprise 
Surveys of 2009 accounted that 59% of the surveyed businesses testified that they 
expect to give µgifts¶ in order to secure a government contract.61 The average price of 
a gift estimated to secure a government contract is a ³OLWWOHOHVVWKDQSHUFHQW of the 
value of the contract.´62 The World Bank and African Development Bank reported 
that 81 percent of business managers identify bribery and corruption to occur very 
regularly in the public procurement process63 without following due diligence. 
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4.3.1 United States v. Titan Corp.64 
To illustrate the impact of international anti-corruption legislation on Benin the Titan 
case may be considered. A US defence contractor, Titan Corp, obtained the right to 
create and operate a wireless telephone system in Benin.65 Titan employed Steven 
Lynwood Head as program manager of business activities in Benin, and later he was 
appointed as CEO of Titan Africa, Inc. Titan made payments to the government for 
WKH VXSSRUW RI %HQLQ¶V LQFXPEHQW SUHVLGHQW UH-election and campaign processes. 
More than $3.5 million was paid as bribes to the President 66 so as to enable Titan 
Company to develop a telecommunications project in Benin.67 Titan was guilty of 
³WKUHHIHORQ\FRXQWVRIYLRODWLQJWKH)&3$´68 In addition, a criminal fine of $13 million 
and a civil penalty of $2.5 million was paid to DOJ and SEC respectively.69 
One of the major arguments against the practise of extraterritoriality in combating the 
bribery of foreign officials is the possible interference which arises in respect to the 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competences of other states.70 The present regulatory 
framework, arguably, has been seen as one which is imperialistic in nature. As this 
dissertation has reiterated severally, the basis of jurisdiction clearly gives a state the 
power to ascertain its sovereignty whether or not the criminal activity occurred in its 
territory. Evidently, the US and Benin had concurrent jurisdiction on this case.71    
In Titan, there was no record that the government or the national institutions of Benin 
engaged in any investigatory processes or prosecution of Titan Corp MNC or the 
President of Benin. Clearly, the argument that extraterritoriality interferes with the 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of states is not out rightly logical and as 
identified in Chapter Two of this dissertation, the fact that extraterritoriality is only 
carried out by a few states does not necessarily mean that the practise is not 
legitimate, given the process or procedure is fair. In this regard, Elizabeth Spahn 
argued that it is ethically appropriate and required that states should employ their 
legal regimes to combat the devastating impact of global corruption in international 
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business.72 Both the bribe givers and bribe takers should be subject to rigorous 
investigation and penalties. In Titan, only the supply side of bribery was dealt with.  
 
We should be reminded that at the centre of critical legal theory is the argument that 
law is used as a tool to oppress and maintain hierarchy. When law will work for the 
interest of developed states legal principles will be strictly applied. However, when it 
will be expected to work vice versa it is often the case that influence, power and 
other political considerations will be brought in to negate the expectations of the 
ordinary workings of the law. An example of this in the area of jurisdictional powers 
over criminal conduct is the curious case of Mark Thatcher and the coup plot he 
sponsored in the small African state of Equatorial Guinea.73 Extradition processes to 
investigate how he got involved with the arrested coup plotters and all indications 
that he had sponsored the coup d'état (here in after, coup) in Equatorial Guinea. The 
prosecutors of Equatorial Guinea requested international arrest of Margaret 
Thatcher's son.74 The request was apparently refused. The precise motive for the 
coup attempt was to corruptly seize the benefit of the 350,000 barrels a day pumped 
into the international market by the small nation which actually is the number three 
oil producer. The coup was therefore, to be for the purpose of taking control of 
Equatorial Guinea, one of Africa's largest oil producer.  
 
It emerged that Mark was one of the key players that facilitated the coup. The 
extradition was perhaps not successful because he was bailed out by high political 
connections in the British establishment. It is necessary to reiterate our position 
therefore, that the logic and structure of law often comes about as a result of power 
relationships. Extradition in international law was created so that states would freely 
have access to regulating affairs they would not normally have access to especially if 
there is no extradition treaty between the states and a grave crime which impacts the 
host state had been committed. The presence and subjective nature of extradition 
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treaty makes it difficult to properly carry out justice where there has been an 
injustice.   
The cases discussed above are examples of cases related to the ECOWAS 
community. These particular cases are treated so as to engage in a nuanced 
discussion of the effects of extraterritorial anti-bribery laws on the principles of 
sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of ECOWAS states. 
4. &ULWLTXH RI WKH ,QFUHDVLQJ 3KHQRPHQD RI ([HUFLVH RI 'HYHORSHG 6WDWHV¶
Jurisdiction on Multinationals and their Subsidiaries Operating in Developing 
Countries  
The cases analyzed above provide a background understanding to the workings of 
multinational corporations in developing countries. Multinational corporations, in their 
nature, operate in several countries.75 They operate by establishing their subsidiaries 
in countries of interest.76 However, when bribery occurs between officials of the 
corporations and local officials of a country (foreign officials), the anti-bribery 
legislations of the home country of the multinational corporations are usually effected 
on the multinational corporations.77 For example, Titan Africa Ltd is a subsidiary of 
Titan Corp (US) which operates in Benin and ABB Ltd has a subsidiary which 
operates in Nigeria. All these subsidiaries provide services in relation to oil industry 
equipment, operate wireless and network services, and provide power and 
automobile technologies respectively.78 The services provided by these subsidiaries 
are important to the economic interests of many developing states. 79  However, 
bribery and corruption have served as cankerworms, which destroy the benefits that 
ought to have accrued to the developing states. Indeed in many cases apart from 
ORVWUHYHQXHVWRWKHKRVWVWDWHVPXOWLQDWLRQDOHQWHUSULVHV¶FRUUXSWLRQLQGHHGKDVEHHQ
noted to encourage abuse of office and breaches of human rights of local citizens.80 
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It has indeed become a notable feature of the United States under the exercise of its 
FCPA jurisdiction to impose heavy punishment against multinational corporations 
from around the world.81 It has unfortunately also become clear that states like the 
U.K. and the US have imposed these fines and punishments solely to the advantage 
of their economies. This is in the sense that despite the fact that the harm is often 
done against weaker states, the huge fines have nearly always accrued only to the 
investigating more powerful state. Whether this mode of decision is consistent to the 
principles of sovereignty and jurisdictional competence is the subject of discussion in 
this section of dissertation.  
The argument put forward here is that, the application of national legislation to 
bribery incidents that ensue between multinational corporations' subsidiaries and 
government officials in ECOWAS states intrudes on the sovereignty and 
jurisdictional competence of ECOWAS members to decide cases within their states. 
First and foremost, it is crucial to reiterate the jurisdictional basis for territoriality and 
extraterritoriality as this will significantly aid the understanding of the imminent 
problem with the present anti-bribery legislations. To begin, one of the basis of 
jurisdiction is the territoriality principle.82 ABB subsidiary bribed the Nigerian top-level 
officials so as to be able to acquire contract deals. This bribery conduct happened 
within the Nigerian territory; the Nigerian territory possesses working bribery and 
corruption laws put into place to curb bribery and ordinarily, it is in their control to 
decide this case and apportion appropriate fines for the corporation. However, the 
territoriality principle is expanded to deal with instances whereby, corrupt conduct 
happened in America but was completed in Nigeria.83 The rule states that the US 
can have the authority over such a case, likewise Nigeria can possess the 
jurisdiction over the case.  
The principles of subjective territoriality and objective territoriality traditionally 
emanate from the landmark principles of territorial jurisdiction. In other words, any 
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case that ensues within a country should be exclusively decided by the country; the 
country possess the authority to decide the 'activity' and persons within its territorial 
borders. The exception to this would be if the performance of the crime commenced 
in another state and the conduct is also an offence in that state. This dissertation 
posits that the primacy of jurisdiction is embedded in the efficacy of a country's 
physical territory. Unfortunately, the increasing fluidity globalisation has created has 
diluted the principles of jurisdiction. In order to advance this main argument, these 
principles should not be usurped for state's national interests hence, a further 
dilution.  
It is repugnant to the principles of 'sovereign equality' and jurisdiction for a state to 
exert its jurisdiction to conduct investigations into events which completely ensued 
within another territory. This may also go against the principle of domestic jurisdiction 
by which all states have primary jurisdiction over matters occurring within their 
territory.84 The norm in IBT has been that the forum state whose corporations or 
persons have supplied bribes to foreign officials can stretch their exterritorial 
jurisdiction (subjective territorial jurisdiction) to regulate the corrupt act. However, it is 
argued that this practice may serve to intrude upon the sovereignty and jurisdiction 
of developing states to decide their domestic matters. Where clearly, in the case of 
businesses bribing abroad the criminal activity and most of the negative effects 
would have occurred within the host state by the subsidiary of a multinational 
corporation, it would be reasonable that the case should be decided by the host 
state. For this to happen, there ought to be a closer cooperation between states like 
the US and the UK and the developing states they have detected the activity in. The 
investigation ought to be cooperative and certainly the fines if any that result at the 
end of trials and or investigations ought to be shared between the home state of the 
multinational cooperation and the host state. 
On the other hand developed states like the US also have their own complaints 
which must be taken into account. Popular assertion advocated against the US 
application of its extraterritorial jurisdiction after the Watergate scandal was the fact 
that the bribery of foreign officials places the US firms at a competitive 
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disadvantage.85 There is also the argument that the FCPA has put American firms at 
a disadvantage level in international trade is questionable. Geo-Jala and Mangum 
DUJXH WKDW ³HYHQ WKRXJK WKH HQIRUFHPHQW KDV ZD[HG DQG ZDQHG WKHUH LV QR
evidence that this enforcement has impeded US trade growth. He asserted that trade 
with countries formerly considered "bribe prone" has exceeded the growth of trade 
with non-bribe-prone countries."86 
The truth, however, is that the current approach of the United States in dealing with 
foreign bribery needs to be curtailed. "In most of the questionable payments 
investigated, American corporations had indulged in bribery to gain a competitive 
edge over the US firms rather than foreign ones".87 Furthermore, this argument is 
faulted on the ground that 80 percent of the world's true multinationals are American 
corporations. A cynical but plausible argument may then be that reducing unfair 
competition in international business arguably simply reduces unfair competition 
among American firms. Better still, the US amendment of the FCPA is simply to gain 
hegemony over international business. Going back to history as discussed in chapter 
three, the FCPA initiated the OECD Convention on bribery of foreign officials. As it 
can be seen in recent enforcement, the FCPA is at the forefront of enforcing its anti-
bribery laws in a very zealous manner. Its best investigatory expertise and 
experience in prosecuting bribery cases have been harnessed to gain jurisdiction 
over any case with a significant or even minimal contact with the US jurisdiction. To 
show that the US FCPA serves as a tool for creating a form of control, various other 
premature countries (with different legal systems, different legal orders and values 
and judicial histories) that are exerting their anti-bribery laws now release their 
jurisdictional power to the U.S to 'decide' their cases. In Innospec's case,88 the U.K. 
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appreciated the US agencies for their cooperation in assisting them with their first 
settlement; the case also had an undertone of enforcement competition between the 
US and U.K. with the US winning the UK on the quest for a 'split share' in the 
penalties.89 7KH 8. PDGH D  µVSOLW VKDUH¶ TXHVW EDVHG RQ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH
criminal act was orchestrated from the UK. In addition, the U.K., French, Netherlands 
all gave the US primacy to decide the Halliburton/TSKJ cases. The level with which 
states allow their cases to be decided by the US is very interesting and may be 
generally representative of the imperialistic practice of contemporary international 
relations. The Statoil case is equally representative of the very wide remit US 
jurisdiction has assumed all over the world; In this case the United States prosecuted 
a Norwegian corporation that had been earlier sanctioned by Norway for lesser 
crimes, surprisingly on the premise that the Norwegian sanctions were 
'inadequate'.90   
A more complicated scenario which illustrates the specifics of subjective or objective 
territoriality, is the Halliburton/TSKJ. In relation to the TSKJ cases, the bribery 
conduct commenced in various states but was completed in Nigeria. The 
Halliburton/TSKJ scenario will pass the test of the territoriality principle. This asserts 
that, a state can claim jurisdiction over a situation which began in the territory of the 
forum states but was completed in another territory. The TSKJ cases began in 
various states including the US but were carried out through some UK agents named 
Chonda and Tesler; the case was completed in Nigeria, as the Nigerian officials 
were given millions of dollars. This case clearly passed the subjective territoriality 
test. However, the discussion still remains that the act occurred within the Nigerian 
territory so Nigeria possessed the jurisdiction to decide upon the case. The argument 
being advanced here is purely that even where the worst bribery scenario possible is 
within jurisdictional contemplation and the recipient state may not be able to decide 
or investigate foreign bribery cases, nothing affects the forum state to allow the 
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recipient state decide, on the basis of its sovereignty and jurisdictional competence, 
cases relating to bribes given to the Nigerian officials. It is crucial to note that the 
pace with which the DOJ and SEC claim jurisdiction on a matter, that recipient state 
lacks the absolute capacity to head its matter in such a gesture. This step can also 
help tackle both the demand side and supply side of bribery.           
Even US courts are beginning to assent to the fact that the congress did not intend 
to include non-subsidiary foreign companies under FCPA jurisdiction.91 This was 
evident in the court's decision on the case of Dooley v. United Technologies Corp.,92 
after it examined whether it had jurisdiction to enforce the FCPA against foreign 
companies. After the court reviewed the legislative history of the FCPA, it concluded 
that the bribery that these foreign companies carried out cannot be dealt with under 
the FCPA jurisdiction.93  
Recently, it was recorded that only 4 per cent of foreign bribery fines were shared 
with the Nigerian government 94 DQG RQO\ ³ SHUcent of $6 billion in fines were 
shared with developing countries whose officials accepted EULEHV´95 Questions may 
be asked as to whether this is proof that states ought to compensate victim states in 
these circumstances.     
It is significant to note that other jurisdictions like France, Japan and China, amongst 
others have joined the bandwagon of exerting their anti-bribery laws across borders 
paying little or no rapt attention to the unparalleled international law concepts of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the recipient states. These barriers are indeed 
alarming for developing states many of which hold major problems of internal and 
cultural cohesion, and history of colonial as well as dictatorial military rule which 
makes it difficult to cope with rigorous and multiple exertion of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Now, the influx of external anti-bribery laws will result in a milieu of 
jurisdictional chaos and a further dilution of the principles of sovereignty. These 
countries will start to apply their extraterritorial jurisdiction on their subsidiaries on 
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bribery which ensued in another territory and this will be a recipe for disaster in the 
multi-cultured characteristics of all ECOWAS states. Not only that, compliance 
problems will be faced by many corporations which in turn will lead to the flight of 
investors thereby, causing impeded economic investment and development. 
Conclusively, one of the lessons to be learnt from these experiences of the improper 
intrusive nature of extraterritorial laws on developing countries and the war against 
bribery of foreign officials is that sustained and empowered democratic governance 
is one of the major tools required to fight against international bribery. There will not 
be any successful progress in adequately fighting international bribery if ECOWAS 
members only have a slim door of independent democratic governance on activities 
which solely occurred within their states.  
 
4.4.1 Minimal v Substantial Effects 
 
One of the recent trends in the application of extraterritorial anti-bribery legislations is 
the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign bribery scenarios which possess only a 
minimum contact with the US territory. This kind of assertion, without the presence of 
any effect on the forum state, is highly intrusive to the domestic affairs of the 
recipient state. This assertion basically entrusts policing power to the forum states to 
decide on foreign affairs in a manner that is not substantiated by a real, clear cut 
FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH IRUXP VWDWH¶V WHUULWRU\ 96  
 
 
Another instance where there was the assertion of jurisdiction involving a minute 
connection with the US territory can be seen in the case of ABB. Commentators 
have argued that this case presents a minimal connection with the US territory, as 
the bribery was perpetuated by a foreign corporation with two of its subsidiaries to 
some Nigerian officials (foreign officials), although one of the subsidiaries was based 
in the US In other words, this foreign bribery was not carried out by any US owned 
corporation. The only connection the US had with the case is the fact that ABB 
subsidiary in the US happened to be a channel through which the bribe was paid to 
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the Nigerian officials.  A minimal contact can occur in instances where a bribery 
occur between a foreign corporation (from country A) and foreign officials (country C) 
but the foreign corporation had subsidiary in (country B) through which the bribery 
was also paid to the foreign officials in Country C. Application of the FCPA on cases 
with minimal contact provides an inconsistent basis for jurisdictional application.  
 
On the other hand, although there is no recent assertion of the UKBA on any 
(&2:$6FDVHVKRZHYHUWKH$FWSURYLGHVIRUDQDVVHUWLRQRIMXULVGLFWLRQLQDµFORVH
FRQQHFWLRQ¶ VFHQDULR 6XFFLQFWO\ FRXQtries possess the capacity to exert their 
jurisdiction across national borders, however, this assertion must be reliable with the 
principles of jurisdiction. The broad anti-bribery efforts of the U.K. and the US are 
crucial ingredients needed for combating an alarming global problem that will only 
get worse if exporting countries fail to control the supply-side of international 
bribery.97 However, these acts are critiqued for "moral imperialism and jurisdictional 
overreaching" because they hold foreign businesses to be subject-able on a minimal 
contact, thereby causing a possible subjection of other corporations to western 
practices of ethical standards.98 
 
What commentators have termed minimal contacts for the purpose of this 
dissertation includes a situation whereby a Swiss company bribes with its US and 
other subsidiary bribes Nigerian oil officials. Passive personality principle should be 
taken into account in deciding anti-bribery case. The ABB case has been argued to 
be one that only had a minimum contact with the US. This is very inconsistent with 
the basis of jurisdiction, the basis of jurisdiction provides for territoriality but it gave 
exception which are subjective territoriality and objective territoriality. Following from 
Akehurst illustration stated in chapter two, that when a person from state A shoots 
another person across state B, both states have concurrent jurisdiction over the 
action. The argument stated by the DOJ was not that Vetco U.K. employees 
undertook any activities within the US. Rather, the DOJ action seemed to be based 
on a claim that some Vetco US employees were performing as agents for Vetco U.K.  
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The doctrine derived from this basis of jurisdiction is the effects principle. As 
discussed, the effects principle is a very controversial principle derivative of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. This principle has been greatly employed in antitrust 
cases, which measure the economic effects that a case causes. The premising 
question here is whether the minimal contact the UK and US agencies have on 
foreign bribery can be categorised under this principle. The US authorities have 
aggressively expanded the FCPA' jurisdictional reach to include a range of foreign 
individuals and entities, as well as US domestic concerns. Yet, there is little or no 
progress as regards how the US courts will reconcile this expansive approach with 
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Commentators have agreed that foreign 
bribery is detrimental to both the forum state and the recipient states. However, there 
is not enough work on how this effect can be measured. In a clear instance between 
a developed country and a developing country, the effects of foreign bribery on these 
countries are different. Arguably, the effect of foreign bribery on a developed nation 
like the US or the U.K. may be that their multinational corporations may be subjected 
to a competitive disadvantage thereby, leading to the loss of lucrative business 
contracts on a fair platform - every corporation doing business should follow 
business ethics and procedural fairness in business dealings. In addition, foreign 
bribery does not only disrupt the international market but it also hampers the test of 
good products without favouritism or fear. On the other hand, the effect of foreign 
bribery on developing countries is that it disrupts good governance. Many of the 
cases of foreign bribery are mainly involved with the major sectors of the society. 
The sectors of oil and gas, energy, transportation and communication are the 
bedrock of amenities, which sustain society. If one is to measure the effect of foreign 
bribery on developing countries, this measurement goes to the root of human 
sustainability. Studies published in the late 1990s found empirical evidence that 
corruption severely affected GDP and foreign investment, diverting monies destined 
for socially valuable products of infrastructure into the pockets of officials. 
         
One of the aspects of extraterritoriality reach is the question of territorial principle. In 
broad respects, the anti-corruption provision, which applies to US domestic 
concerns, that is, US persons and businesses, foreign issuers on the US stock 
exchange, and foreign individuals or entities in respect of acts undertaken in the US 
(traditional territorial jurisdiction). There is narrow clarity as to how the US courts 
95 
 
would approach the extraterritorial application of the FCPA because cases are 
usually settled. A recent judicial decision suggests that the US courts might be more 
conservative than US enforcement agencies in asserting jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants - a US court recently declined to exert personal jurisdiction over a 
German national on the basis that he did not have the required minimum contact 
with the US as required under the Constitution.99 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court took the view that neither receiving a phone call from the US nor depositing 
bribe payments in a New York bank provided sufficient evidence of conduct directed 
towards the US. Another recent case suggests, however, that the US courts may 
exercise jurisdiction over a person who authorises a bribe, directs the concealment 
of a bribe or plays a role in falsifying or manipulating financial statements relied upon 
by US investors, because such actions are viewed as "directed to deceiving US 
shareholders"100  
4.4.2 Mutual Legal Assistance 
 
One of the emerging characteristics in the international response to multi-
jurisdictional bribery scandal is the mechanism of bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties (MLAT). Mutual legal assistance is the formal means employed to obtain a 
criminal evidence in one country to assist in criminal proceeding or investigation in 
another country.101  This mechanism is usually used in solving multi-jurisdictional 
criminal dispute.102 In the context of foreign bribery, for example, the decision of a 
corrupt act performed by various multinational corporations from different 
jurisdictions can be subjected to the mechanism of mutual legal assistance where 
various jurisdictions involved provide relevant information needed for the 
investigatory process.103 For instance, the MLAT between the UK and the Nigeria 
has been employed on various occasions by both states. In 2007, the UK demanded 
its officials to question top ranking Nigerian officials and business tycoons. These 
include: the former governor of Delta State, James Ibori, and the request for whom 
                                                          
99
 SEC v Saref, 11 Civ. 9073 (Dkt. Entry No. 33, February 19 2013) 
100
 SEC v Straub, 11 Civ. 9645 (Dkt. Entry No. 48, February 8 2013) 
101
 µ0XWXDO /HJDO $VVLVWDQFH 5HTXHVWV¶ Gov.uk, 24 December 2014) < 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/mutual-legal-assistance-mla-requests> accessed on 5 April 2015 
102
 Mark Pieth, Recovering Stolen Assets (Germany: Peter Lang, 2008) 100  
103




was called off for procedural purposes, and the Chairman of Globacom, Chief Mike 
Adenuga, with regards to his business operations.104  
 
The Nigerian-UK Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty has undeniably become the 
standard for mutual cooperation between other Western states and Nigeria. In the 
display of a major bribery scandal involving significant amounts given by Siemens105 
to many Nigerian government officials the Nigerian former President, Yar' adua 
sought the cooperation of his German counterpart that, '[w]e need a Mutual Legal 
Assistance treaty, similar to the one we have with the United Kingdom because it 
serves as a deterrent to underhand dealings and corruption'.106 
 
While it is apparent that this particular variety of treaties has demonstrated that it is 
quite valuable and will continue to serve as a pivotal tool in the armoury of anti-
bribery and anti-corruption agencies, a few faults are evident. These faults arguably 
re-trigger the concerns that state governments are overprotective of alleged national 
interests even to the point of "rendering meaningless the obligations they have 
undertaken in mutual assistance treaties."107 Nigeria's proactive request for major 
investigations and convictions in the US concerning the bribery of its officials by the 
US multinational corporation Halliburton was rejected. Nigeria needed and requested 
for Mutual Legal Assistance over the huge $180 million Halliburton/TSKJ bribery 
issue; Nigeria was rejected on the ground that, Article 111(3) of the MLAT 108 
provides for refusal of effecting MLAT request by the central authority of the 
requested state for enumerated reasons. This provision was utilized by the United 
States. Indeed many foreign bribery cases show that the prosecutions and resulting 
fines charged after conviction of multinational corporations and their executives are 
                                                          
104
 Funsho Muraina, 'Nigeria: UK Wants to Quiz Adenuga, Says AG' (This Day, 4 December 2007) < 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200712040005.html> accessed on 14 June 2015  
105
 Simon Romero, 'Halliburton Severs Link With 2 Over Nigeria Inquiry' (The New York Times, 19 
June 2004) http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/business/halliburton-severs-link-with-2-over-nigeria-
inquiry.html?_r=0 accessed on 4 June 2015; 'Nigeria Probes Siemens Bribe Case' (BBC News, 21 
November 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hiworld/africa/7105582.stm accessed 18 August 2015; 
Estelle Shirbon, 'Update I-Nigeria to Investigate Siemens Bribes Scandal', (Reuters, 19 November 
2007) http://www.rcuters.com/article/companvNewsAndPR/idUSLl931303520071119 accessed 10 
September 2015 
106
 Official Website of the Office of Public Communications, 'President Yar'Adua Re assures of his 
Commitment to Combat Corruption' (21 January 2008) <http//www.niveriafirstore/article 7997 shtml> 





 Mutual Legal Assistance Art 111(3) 
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solely directed for the benefit of the forum states. This was definitely the case in SEC 
v ABB (Nigeria), Halliburton/TSKJ (Nigeria) and United States v. Titan Corp (Benin).  
 
4.4.3 Foreign Nationals Subjected to the FCPA Jurisdiction 
 
The significant issue raised is the US assertion of jurisdiction over both juristic and 
physical persons irrespective of the state of origin. The expansion of the Act in the 
1998 amendment provides to include any issuer or domestic concern or an officer, 
HPSOR\HHRUDQ\DJHQWZKRLVDµ8QLWHG6WDWHGSHUVRQ¶$µ8QLWHG6WDWHVSHUVRQ¶LV
VLPSO\ GHILQHG DV DQ\ ³QDWLRQDO RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV« RU DQ\ FRUSRUDWLon, 
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated 
organisation, or sole proprietorship organised under the laws of the United 
6WDWHV´109 However, critics of the 1998 amendments assert WKDWWKH)&3$¶VFODLPRI
subject matter jXULVGLFWLRQRYHUD IRUHLJQQDWLRQDOVKRXOGRQO\EHDSSOLHG LI ³ WKH
action was more than mere preparation; (2) the action was material to the 
perpetration of the violation; and (3) it could fairly be said that the action directly 
FDXVHGWKHYLRODWLRQ´110 This test presents a fair assessment of the conduct at hand 
and the extent of the participation of the subject matter in the conduct.  
 
The case of ABB is a sample case to show the US assertion of its jurisdiction on 
foreign nationals. Certainly, definite bribery conduct within the US was not 
established in the legal action, let alone substantial conduct that could partially be 
said to have caused the violation. This case did not possess sufficient facts to meet 
the criteria. On the other hand, even if there was sufficient facts to meet the criteria 
discussed, in a general parlance, the interest of the United States in foreign bribery 
is worthy of adequate questioning. The immediate fashion of exertion of the US 
personal jurisdiction on the ABB case is unwarranted as sufficient minimum contacts 
should not have triggered an FCPA jurisdiction.  
 
Although the foreign nationals in the case of ABB are not Nigerian officials, and may 
not have a dual nationality with Nigeria, however, such cases show that the FCPA 
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FDQ HDVLO\ SRVVHVV MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU (&2:$6 PHPEHUV¶ QDWLRQDOV LQ VLWXDWLRQV RI
minimal contact with the FCPA. Jurisdiction with respect to nationality is assumed by 
the state of which the accused is a national. FCPA categorisation of every issuer, 
association, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, 
XQLQFRUSRUDWHGRUJDQLVDWLRQRU VROHSURSULHWRUVKLSXQGHU WKHXPEUHOODRID µ8QLWHG
6WDWHSHUVRQ¶FUHDWHVP\ULDGFRQIXVLRQRQ WKHSROLWLFDODQG OHJDOFRQFHSWRIZKRD
national is. This dissertation is not ascertaining that foreign nationals should not be 
subjected under the FCPA action if there is a significant violation of the Act but there 
has to be a clear cut understanding of who a United States person is, because any 
juristic and physical persons attached to the United States could automatically be 
covered by this blanket and subjective classification which only the US courts or 
agencies would have the ability to provide a meaning to. It is to be remembered that, 
it is the US norm to employ every theoretical, legal, historical tool to ascertain its 
jurisdiction over a given case, also given the peculiar nature of cases in that 
depending on the interest at hand, similar cases may not likely be treated alike. The 
jurisdictional competencHRIWKHVWDWH¶VFRXUWVRUUHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHVLVEDVHGRQWKH
loyalty owed by the accused to his state of origin. This accused may be juristic or 
physical person. In cases of double nationality, both states possess equal jurisdiction 
over the matter. Thus, in the James Ibori case, the UK sentenced the accused for 
grand corruption even though he was a national of both the U.K. and Nigeria, and 
even though the particular facts of the offense largely took place in Nigeria. 
 
On the other hand, David Elesinmogun and Obumneme Egwutatu argued that the 
penalty for "paying bribes in Nigeria  may increase following demands from a 
Nigerian NGO that the Nigerian government seek its share of the recent anti-graft 
ERXQW\´111. The assertion of nationality jurisdiction on cases whereby the Nigerian 
officials have been bribed by foreign persons can lead to a tussle of jurisdictional 
assertion. What needs to be ascertained is the intensity of the effects of the bribery 
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4.4.4 Level Playing Field 
 
A dominant theme in the FCPA anti-FRUUXSWLRQVWUDWHJ\LVWKHHPSKDVLVRQµOHYHOOLQJ
WKHSOD\LQJILHOG¶If corruption is prevented by extraterritorial laws and foreign actors 
with some connection to the US are prevented from bribery then business of the 
United States and its corporations are protected. This is not a surprising discovery 
from the perspective of critical legal theory because it is realised that ultimately the 
direction of law in most societies and the international society is to maintain the 
benefit of states. More so, it is increasingly accepted that much of international law is 
created to sustain the rulership of the West. The initial drive of the existence of the 
FCPA was to instil trust in the American corporation, this purpose has exceeded 
instilling the trust to making other individuals or corporation succumb to the US 
jurisdictional pull even as a result of a minimum link to the US such as under the 
rules of the FCPA. The case of United States v. JGC Corp betrays112 some of the 
aspects of this truth. It portrays the oppressive side of the application of the FCPA. 
The alleged bribery in this case was between a Japanese Corporation and Nigerian 
public officials. The only ties the JGC Corp had with the U.S was the fact that JGC 
had connived with an American joint-venture partner, and that wire transfers ± 
originating in and arriving at wholly foreign bank accounts ± passed through New 
York bank accounts. The question that may be asked is how does transferring 
money through the New York bank be deemed as violation of the FCPA when the 
transfer does not in any way pose a risk of any particular direct Impact on the US 
markets. 
 
4.4.5 The Protective Principle 
 
The principle of protective or security principle is one which will constantly have a 
significant relevance given the extraordinary emergence and presence of the 
involvement of foreign nationals (both physical and juristic persons) in the crime of 
bribery of foreign officials. Here, a state assumes jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of 
law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens its 
security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions, provided the 
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conduct is generally recognised as a crime under the law of states that have 
reasonably developed legal systems. This is essentially true in emergence of the 
developing moral legalism and international public strategy which inform the attitude 
and content of both national and international legislation against the bribery of 
foreign officials. 113  
 
4.4.6 Conformity and Inconformity with the Passive Personality Principle 
 
The passive personality principle bestows on a state the power to adopt laws that 
DSSO\ WR FRQGXFW RI IRUHLJQ QDWLRQDOV ZKR FRPPLW FULPHV DJDLQVW WKH VRYHUHLJQ¶V
QDWLRQDOVZKLOHWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶V QDWLRQDOVDUHRXWVLGHRIWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VWHUULWRU\ The 
passive personality principle bestows on a state the power to adopt laws that apply 
WRFRQGXFWRIIRUHLJQQDWLRQDOVZKRFRPPLWFULPHVDJDLQVWWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VQDWLRQDOV
ZKLOHWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VQDWLRQDOV DUHRXWVLGHRIWKHVRYHUHLJQ¶VWHUULWRU\114 Conforming 
to the passive personality principle is complex. In fact, all dissenting Judges in the 
case of Lotus115 rejected this principle. Judge Moore in his dissenting opinion stated 
that accepting the passive personality principle as a basis of jurisdiction meant that a 
VWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOZKLOHWUDYHOOLQJWRDQRWKHUVWDWHFDUULHVZLWKKLPWKHODZRIKLVRZQ
state for his protection.116 Clearly, this assertion is deemed contrary to the principle 
that such a person ought to put himself under the sovereignty and protection of the 
UHFHLYLQJ VWDWH ³H[FHSW WKDW KLV JRYHUQPHQW PD\ LQWHUYHQH LQ FDVH RI GHQLDO RI
MXVWLFH´117 A case which will be dealt with in this respect is the case of Suleiman A. 
Nassar.  
 
This case serves as an example of cooperation between in extradition processes. Mr 
Nassar who was the regional vice president of Lockheed International bribed a 
member of the Egyptian parliament with $1 million so as to sell three C-130 military 
cargo planes worth $79 million.118  This case is yet another case which has been 
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 5LFKDUG / &DVVLQ µ7KH )XJLWLYH )OLHV 3DUW ,,,¶ FCPA Blog, 22 September 2009) < 
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noted as a good example of international cooperation in anti-corruption issues.119 
However, close attention needs to be paid to the entirety of the case. After various 
attempts to extradite Mr Nassar failed, the Libyan government cooperated with the 
US An interesting fact in this case is that Syrian became very interested in the case 
as it generated global headlines. Based on the doctrine of extraterritoriality, the 
Syrian government wanted to try Nassar for violating the FCPA however, the US 
prosecutors partially denied that it was not exactly the trial of Mr Nassar they were 
DIWHU0U1DVVDU¶VSURSHUWLHVDQGDVVHWVZHUH IUR]HQ120 This caused a huge strain 
on Mr Nassar and family. Due to this Mr Nassar was extradited to the US Mr Nassar 
almost became the first individual to be tried outside the US for FCPA violation. It is 
evident that the US capacity to reach any individual anywhere in the world is 
alarming. The US possess the capacity to ensure a corrupt conduct pertaining to its 
territory is decided by its organisations. So as to get to Mr Nassar, the US froze all 
his assets worldwide including his $750,000 pension. This case restates the 
argument that powerful states possess enormous strength and capacity to ensure 




In conclusion, the hegemonic nature of regional integration usually results in regional 
groups hedging against other regional groups or non-members of the group. To 
achieve global anti-bribery legislation, regional groups have to examine their roles, 
especially the ECOWAS, in the globalisation process. They have to examine 
whether their integration serves as a vehicle or obstacle in the globalisation process. 
It is crucial to remember that just as all the bases of jurisdiction may empower a 
state to carry out intrusive investigations, so also can these bases stand for the 
ample non cooperative approach by another state in ensuring that the recipient state 
have jurisdiction over its domestic affairs.  
 
The essence of the present anti-bribery regulatory regime is to deter bribery, 
however, this deterrence through rigorous pattern of enforcement has resulted in 
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deterring investment in emerging economies. This effect conflicts with the purpose of 
the FCPA. This essentially signifies a wakeup call to the ECOWAS community to not 
only effectively curb the demand-side of bribery but to hold multinational corporations 
into account for damages caused. 
   
Ascertaining jurisdiction on matters detrimental to the growth and the development of 
the ECOWAS community can present a challenge to weak states hampered through 
world powers with sophisticated legal theories and entrenched legal history, 
circumventing the demand of developing countries to exert their jurisdictional powers 
without intrusion, rather than responding to a simple request to cooperate and supply 
LQIRUPDWLRQIRULQYHVWLJDWRU\SXUSRVHV$QH[DPSOHRIWKLVFLUFXPYHQWLRQLV1LJHULD¶V
recent demand for the repatriation of her stolen funds. It is clear that these funds are 
stolen, and various developed nations serve as safe havens for this funds. However, 
Switzerland, for example asked Nigeria to explain what she would do to the 
repatriated fund. This is really egregious to the principles of sovereignty and 
MXULVGLFWLRQDO FRPSHWHQFH RI D QDWLRQ¶V ]HDO WR UHSDWULDWH KHU VWROHQ IXQGV 7KH
DVVHUWLRQ RI GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ MXULVGLFWLRQ RQ IRUHLJQ EULEHU\ FDQ EH IUXVWUDWHG
through various cumbersome and dynamic regulatory strongholds.  
 
Curbing international bribery is essential for many significant reasons, however, the 
hypocrisy behind the use and so-called purpose of current anti-bribery legislations 
and regulatory system is far from effectively curbing foreign bribery. The resultant 
effect is a hampering of sovereign equality and jurisdictional competence on matters 
which are solely to be decided by a territory. Therefore an international regime which 
will empower ECOWAS community is essential. Essentially, a universal legislation 
on combating of foreign bribery needs to be created.     
 
Developing countries are looking to regulate their own system - to regulate their 
domestic affairs. Many of the crimes discussed above were committed within the 
ECOWAS territory. ECOWAS states themselves ought to have been proactive and 
retain jurisdiction over the investigation. The perceived imperialistic tendencies 
(reminiscent of colonialism) appear however, to have hindered the majority of 
developing countries' jurisdictional competence in matters regarding their states and 
matters which solely, directly and negatively affect them. And that is why the critical 
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legal theory asserts that law is a tool used for the preservation of elite states' 
interests who have created these laws. International regulation of crime is 
orchestrated in such a manner that arguably favours the developed states. The 
OECD creation of a convention for combating of bribery of foreign officials in IBTs 
was created by the US to protect its states interest; the movement into the 
international regulation of corruption was pioneered by the U.S and its OECD 
member states for the protection of their economic policies. However, the protection 
of states sovereignty and jurisdictional competence should be at the forefront of 
customary international law. The ECOWAS needs to formulate a regulatory 
response of their own on the issue of foreign investigations into economic and 
financial crimes that occur within their jurisdiction from abroad and to demand that 




THE EFFECTS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY ON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND 
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCES OF ECOWAS STATES: STRATEGIES TO 
ENSURE MORE EQUITABLE REGULATION OF CORRUPTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
 
5.1 The Effects of Extraterritoriality on the Sovereignty and Jurisdictional 
Competences of ECOWAS States 
 
States' assertion of their extraterritorial jurisdiction is inevitable. In fact, this 
dissertation concluded that the assertion of extraterritoriality cannot be removed from 
this period of great interdependence and market capitalism. Chapter three argued 
that the principles of jurisdiction (discussed in chapter two) show that the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is beneficial to the strengthening of states jurisdiction as 
states would possess the platform to adequately govern their fluid domestic affairs 
across borders. However, chapter three argued that although all states possess the 
power and authority to use their extraterritorial jurisdiction, the present international 
regulatory system is stacked with huge inequity causing some states to have more 
power in their extraterritorial assertions than others like ECOWAS states. Gerry 
Simpson called this inequity the power imbalance between 'Great Powers and 
Outlaw States'.1 The regulation of commerce and trade even in the specialist area of 
anticorruption laws cannot be carried out exclusively on elite states' terms and laws.2 
Such a position will hamper the true interests of all nations in combating the 
international malaise of corruption which has negatively affected international 
business and even international relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries. 
 
It is imperative to note that the law and practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction is still in 
its infancy. The regulatory rigorousness of countries like the US and UK amongst 
others has significantly propelled the international community's awareness on the 
seriousness of the impact of foreign bribery and corruption on IBTs and national 
transactions. Sections 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 2 and3 of the FCPA and Sections 2, 6 
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 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co. (1972) 407 U.S. 1, 9. Chief Justice Burger stated that "we 
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, 
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." 
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and 7 of the Bribery Act are particular examples of aggressive legislation that signal 
the possibility of the development of universalisation of jurisdiction over corruption 
crimes. These provisions can become a blue print for most other states to adopt but 
on their own for now only represent proof of the diplomatic power of the two states 
discussed particularly. Therefore, the present practice of extraterritoriality principles 
in international law in respect to the application of anti-corruption laws need to be 
significantly shored up legally across the world for the legislation of the US and UK 
not to be an aberration and a disturbance of the settled principles of international 
laws on jurisdiction.  
 
,WLVDSSDUHQWWKDWDWSUHVHQW(&2:$6VWDWHV¶TXHVWIRUFRRSHUDWLRQDQGDVVLVWDQFH
from their western counterparts has not been reciprocal. This lack of reciprocity 
significantly undermines the sovereignty and jurisdictional competence of the 
requesting states. For example, in the Wilbros scam,3 the Nigerian authorities were 
expressly informed by US authorities that evidence in form of facts and data against 
the senior officials of Shell Petroleum Development Company who partook in the 
scam were undisclosed, and thus, the high officials of Shell Company were to remain 
anonymous. Chief Michael Aondoakaa, the Nigerian Attorney General who led the 
investigatory process on the scam stated that: 
 
"Why is it that only the names of the Nigerians officials that were on display? Why 
are they shielding the Shell's officials? These are relevant questions we should be 
asking as Nigerians. We are pressuring the US authorities to release the names of 
the Shell's officials."4 
 
The absence of reciprocity defeats the purpose of ascertaining state's jurisdiction in 
an investigation which in turn defeats the claim of sovereignty equality which 
international law seems to uphold. Furthermore, the Halliburton investigation also 
showed the reluctance of the US to release Dick Cheney to answer to the Halliburton 
scandal. Like the Wilbros scam, when the Nigerian government requested the 
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 The Wilbros scam is a bribery contract scam of $6 million which was allegedly paid to some Nigerian 
high officials. See Chika Amanze-1ZDFKXNX µ1LJHULD ,¶P QRW ,QYROYHG LQ :LOEURV &RQWUDFW 6FDP
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'Nigeria: UK Wants to Quiz Adenuga, Says AG' (This Day, 4 December 2007)  
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H[WUDGLWLRQ RI 'LFN &KHQH\ &KHQH\¶V ODZ\HU 7HUUHQFH 2¶'RQQHOO VWDWHG WKDW DQ
investigation was conducted by United States fedeUDO SURVHFXWRUV DQG ³IRXQG QR
VXJJHVWLRQRIDQ\LPSURSULHW\E\'LFN&KHQH\LQKLVUROHDVWKH&(2RI+DOOLEXUWRQ´5 
The US did not cooperate with the Nigeria's quest to further investigate one of the 
biggest bribery scandals in the 21st Century.   
 
Indeed it appears that in many cases where the allegation of impropriety, bribery and 
corruption emanates from an ECOWAS State, the determination by developed State 
will be that the allegations are baseless. This often lets executives from Western 
corporations off the hook leading to the further plundering of ECOWAS. Another 
instance of this is the allegations by an incoming Ghanaian government which 
GHWHFWHG HYLGHQFH RI EULEHU\ DQG FRUUXSWLRQ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR *KDQD¶V ILUVW RLO
discovery field which was awarded to an American company Kosmos. The 
investigation and request for cooperation came to a swift end as soon as the 
Department of Justice came to the conclusion that there was no proof of the 
allegations.6 This is despite the fact that the facts were best investigated in Ghana 
where the allegations emanated from and most of the bribe recipients may be found. 
There is also the strong inference that can be drawn from the very one sided and 
favourable contract to Kosmos. Eventually, Kosmos negotiated a settlement with the 
Ghanaian government after serious threats to destroy the nascent Ghanaian oil 
industry through negative press in the small oil and gas investor community.7  
 
The present application of extraterritorial laws concerning the foreign bribery is 
arguably PDQLIHVWO\ XQIDLU DQG VWDFNHG LQ IDYRXU RI WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI HOLWH VWDWHV¶
interests. It is crucial to reiterate that the principles and rules of international law on 
jurisdiction of the state works in such a way that a state is not generally compelled by 
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international law to enforce its criminal jurisdiction.8 Navigating the regulatory space 
between national and international spheres poses huge complexities. The solution to 
the present regulatory framework is not farfetched. There should be an express 
universal jurisdiction where any state could investigate and prosecute the act of the 
bribery of foreign officials in the international sphere. However, the pressing 
questions that would need to be answered are whether there would be sophisticated 
and robust procedures by which states would come to their decisions and whether 
these procedures can be made more transparent and equally accessible by both 
developed and developing states like ECOWAS states.   
 
5.2 Summary and Recommendations 
 
This chapter has argued that the current basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
combating the bribery of foreign officials in IBTs should be reformulated. Rather than 
base it solely on the state through their application of territorial and nationality 
principles, it should be based on a universal jurisdiction where every state possesses 
equal sovereignty to prosecute the offence of the bribery of foreign officials in IBTs.  
 
Clearly, the problem of bribery of foreign officials is very detrimental to international 
business. As discussed in chapter three and four, this problem does not only distort 
the efficacy of good business and trade, it also weakens good governance and the 
rule of law. In addition, it leads to acute poverty in the developing world.  
 
Corruption in IBT is a complex area to regulate. It is difficult because while some 
states possess the drive and determination to eradicate corruption in international 
business, some other states are reluctant to do so. The sudden and rapid increase in 
the application of extra territorialism by western states like the US and the UK also 
triggers controversy regarding the basis of such jurisdiction on combating bribery in 
international business. 
 
The cases discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 showed the wide spread nature of foreign 
bribery on both national and international levels especially in the emerging 
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economies of the ECOWAS community. The present regulatory environment in form 
of soft laws, treaties, radical national laws as well as regulatory enforcement 
agencies are usually cateJRULVHGLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZOLWHUDWXUHDVµLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶WRROV
for combating the bribery of foreign officials. These international tools are 
characterised by inconsistencies in meanings, enforcements and purposes. 
Additionally, although some national laws and institutions pursue the purpose of 
curbing foreign bribery in international business, their role and regulatory strength 
are not encompassing enough to oversee the complexities of bribery. For a holistic 
approach, it remains plausible to consider the DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH µXQLYHUVDOLW\
SULQFLSOH¶ 
 
A famous aspect of criminal acts covered under the international universal 
jurisdiction is that of piracy. A universal jurisdiction is established over an act of 
piracy committed anywhere in the world, irrespective of the nationality of the 
criminal. 9  Customary and conventional international law notably recognises 
jurisdiction over this act. It works in a way that a piratical conduct against a ship falls 
under the ambit of any state where the pirate has been detained. In addition, anyone 
who takes part in a piratical act is also a pirate. 10  Therefore, extending the 
universality jurisdiction to move beyond aerial hijacking and such acts as slave 
trading and genocide to areas like terrorism, money laundering as well as the central 
topic of discussion in this dissertation (bribery of foreign officials) presents a 
possibility of a unique dealing with bribery and corruption.  
 
Corruption in international business consist of the amalgamation of three deadly 
perennial problems which is somewhat difficult to be regulated by a handful of 
developed nations. These three includes; terrorism, money laundering and bribery 
(grand corruption). Seeing as there is a synergetic relationship between these ills, a 
similar strategy needs to be put in place to curb their adverse effects. Money 
laundering and bribery are closely intertwined. Most of the monies earned by foreign 
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Under International Law (University of Pennsylvania Press 2004) 47-49 
10
 0DGHOLQH+0RUULVµ8QLYHUVDO-XULVGLFWLRQLQD'LYLGHG:RUOG&RQIHUHQFH5HPDUNV¶1HZ
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officials through bribery are usually laundered to developed states. 11  As rapt 
attention was given to the ill-fated September 11 2001 attack which caused a 
rigorous swing in the assertion of universal jurisdiction, well calculated and rigorous 
attention needs to be carried out universally over the facilitators and perpetrators of 
foreign bribery. In that respect, multinationals nationals that engage in bribery abroad 
would be adequately dealt with. In the same vein, foreign government officials of 
ECOWAS states who have assumed the irresponsible position of accepting bribes 
and amassing significant wealth for personal interests would be subject to 
international jurisdiction. This significant step will not only accentuate the assertion 
that bribery and corruption can be efficiently combated as multinational corporations 
who pay bribes are carved from under the sole jurisdiction of their interest seeking 
states, but it will also ensure that the pattern of pardoning and recycling corrupt 
leaders12 in the developing world is consequently dealt with.    
 
Clearly, there is huge reluctance to formally confront the inequalities embedded in 
contemporary international law.13 Castel identified in his work that extraterritoriality is 
no longer a low noticeable difficulty. It is crucial for procedures and standards to be 
created to adequately resolve legal and political issues in a proportional manner. 
 
International regulation of grand corruption in business like any other international 
issues is a complex and murky terrain to regulate. Due to the global 
interconnectedness and interdependence, the present problems and issues 
countries face do not only affect the respective countries, but these problems spread 
to other countries. This is why the solution to any transnational issue always seek a 
form of international intervention or regulation which possesses the framework to 
foster solution. Although international law has been resorted to solve international 
problems, it has been argued that international law is stuck and underdeveloped. 
International law is very late to the awareness of complex international issues and 
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1LJHULD¶V PRQH\ ³-DPHV ,ERUL ERXJKW D KRXVH LQ +DPSVWHDG QRrth London, for £2.2m. A £3.2m 
mansion in Sadnton, South Africa, a property in Shaftesbury, Dorset, for over £311,000, A fleet of 
armoured Range Rovers valued at £600,000, a £120,000 Bentley, and a Mercedes Maybach for 
HXRUV´See µ)RUPHU1LJHULD*RYHUQRU-DPHV,ERUL-DLOHGIRU\HDUV¶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problems like the equal assertion of jurisdiction on matters which affects the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of states.  
 
Even though the problem of underdevelopment of international law persists, the 
regulation of many issues ranging from terrorism to climate change still look up to 
international law for some solutions. For example, the present regulation of bribery 
and corruption in IBTs, as discussed in this dissertation, possess inequities which 
must be readdressed through incremental developments to international law itself.  
 
The present regional anti-corruption regulations and general anti-corruption treaties 
stipulate that there should be cooperation and assistance between countries when 
needed. This clause can be problematic because it gives states the discretion to 
decide whether or not to give cooperation or assistance especially in 
multijurisdictional matters.  As mentioned above on many occasions, developing 
countries with a serious stake in corrupt transactions have been denied cooperation 
and assistance in the investigatory processes of bribery and financial scandals 
deeply related to their territories. 
 
The present treaties on extraterritorial application of laws in relation to corruption 
should be reformulated and amended. The fluidity of how international law can be 
used presents the problem of whether international law is really law. Especially in 
relation to cooperation and assistance, it should be stated that states must give their 
assistance and full cooperation in the investigatory and prosecutorial processes of 
grand corruption situations. This is already dictated in the provisions of Article 16 of 
the UNCAC:  
 
Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international 
organizations. 
 
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may 
be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, 
the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a 
public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, 
for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the 
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official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in 
order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the 
conduct of international business. 
Furthermore, countries party to this treaty have agreed to cooperate with one 
another in every aspect of the fight against corruption, including prevention, 
investigation, and the prosecution of offenders. Clearly state parties are already 
bound by the Convention to render specific forms of mutual legal assistance in 
gathering and transferring evidence for use in court.14 
 
It is in fact the case that the drafters of the UNCAC must have envisaged a future 
where universal jurisdiction on piracy15 may one day apply to corruption.  
 
ECOWAS states should be the first to stamp the problems out by universalising their 
jurisdiction on combating bribery. States within the ECOWAS community need to 
create laws like the FCPA and UKBA. In conjunction with this, a regional convention 
based on combating foreign bribery needs to be created. The jurisdictional 
competences of ECOWAS states needs to be shored up; the enforcement 
mechanisms, regulatory systems need to undergo thorough developments in 
regulating foreign bribery within the community.  
 
There should exist an international body which is concerned with balancing the 
conflicts of jurisdiction in foreign bribery cases and investigations. The UNCAC 
serves as an example of the most widely signed up to treaty in the regulation of 
corruption, but it is weak as a result of the fact that agreements signed are not 
concrete. These agreements are permissible agreements which are not concrete. 
Cooperation and assistance between states in the processes of ascertaining 
jurisdiction on the regulation of corruption must be obligatory. 
 
Foreign bribery and grand corruption are heinous crimes which are repugnant to 
equity, justice and good conscience. A universal jurisdiction is a key way in which 
                                                          
14
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15
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states can enforce their duties under international law and a pivotal condition pattern 
to the curbing or eradicating of the impunity of the serious crime of corruption.  
 
Another major reason for creating a holistic international law on combating corruption 
is not to leave the demand side of bribery untouched. Leaving the demand side of 
bribery creates a false representation of the intention of international law to 
successfully combat the bribery of foreign officials. It basically shows that 
international law is mainly used as a tool to guide the trade interests of some specific 
VWDWHV &ULWLFDO OHJDO WKHRU\¶V DVVHUWLRQ RQ WKH KLHUDUFKLFDO QDWXUH RI ODZ FUHDWLRQ
shows that international law is used as a mechanism to keep fostering the power of 
certain states over the other. From the inception of extraterritoriality to its practice in 
FRQWHPSRUDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ RQH WKLQJ LV FRPPRQ WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI VWDWH¶V
national policy rather than the holistic punishments of perpetrators of corruption in 
international commerce. The language used and emphasis cast on the creation and 
actualisation of anti-corruption laws is fixed on the protection of domestic markets 
and prevention of adverse effects on the domestic fortunes.  
  
In a globalised world, interdependence is commonplace and perpetrators of 
corruption in IBT are bound to increase. Foreign bribery has been correctly framed 
as part of international crimes. They are so egregious that they offend the 
sensibilities and authenticity of good businessmen and women in the international 
sphere. The creation, emergence and purposeful enforcement of the FCPA ensures 
that the bribery of foreign officials in IBTs is a good start to the eradication of 
corruption in the international systems. However, the international community must 
bear in mind that the present extraterritorial application of jurisdiction is one-sided. 
This one-sidedness does not only cause an undermining of the sovereignty and 
jurisdictional competences of developing states, but it also causes a loop hole in the 
in the true regulation of corruption in international law. Therefore, the international 
community must be vigorous in seeing that justice is done in the combating of 
bribery of foreign officials as well the upholding of landmark principles of international 
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